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From Prerogative to AcCountability:
The Amenability of the President
to Suit
By LAURA KRUGMAN RAY*
INTRODUCTION
When in the fall of 1990 President George Bush announced a
shift in his Persian Gulf strategy from a defensive to an offensive
posture, a number of lawsuits were filed against the President
questioning his power to commence military operations against
Iraq without congressional approval.' In the controversy surround-
ing the President's policy, little attention was paid to the form of
this protest, and yet the filing of these lawsuits represents a quiet
revolution in presidential accountability under the rule of law.
From the end of the Civil War until the final days of the
Watergate drama, legal gospel held that the President of the United
States enjoyed immunity from suit. With the issuance of its opinion
in United States v. Nixon2 in 1974, however, the Supreme Court
demonstrated that a President could be amenable to legal process.
Since that date, the federal courts have entertained numerous ac-
tions by private and government litigants against Presidents of the
United States. The Court has never, however, provided a rationale
for this doctrinal shift, leaving the lower courts to evaluate the
propriety of actions against Presidents under an assortment of
oblique legal theories.
The question of whether the nation's chief executive may be
sued touches the quick of the American system of government. On
one side are the arguments that support immunity from suit: the
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. A.B. 1967, Bryn
Mawr College; Ph.D. 1971, J.D. 1981, Yale University. I would like to thank Alan Garfield,
John Hart, and Philip Ray for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Daniel Hetznecker, Cynthia Klosowski, and Andrew Ross provided valuable research assis-
tance.
See infra notes 359-87 and accompanying text.
2 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
special deference owed to the President as the only government
official elected by all the people; the extraordinary demands on
the President's time and energy imposed by the duties of his office;
and the lingering sense, embodied by the political question doctrine,
that the voting booth rather than the courthouse is the proper
forum for resolving disputes over presidential conduct. The coun-
terarguments are equally fundamental: the constitutional mandate
for checks on the powers of each branch of government; the role
of the courts as a politically insulated and therefore independentexpositor of the law; and the precept that no person, even the
President, is above the law.3
It is therefore surprising that the Supreme Court has never
resolved the question of the President's amenability to suit.4 Al-
though lower federal courts ruled on the issue in several Watergate
cases filed against President Richard Nixon, 5 the Supreme Court
limited its opinion in United States v. Nixon to the executive
I There is a voluminous literature about the presidency. The classic book on the
subject is EDWARD CORWIN, TIE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS (1957). See also CLINTON
RosSrrER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1956); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY (1973); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS (1957); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT (1957); ROBERT G. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRESIDENCY (1971); WILLIAM H. TART, THE PRESIDENCY (1916). For useful articles on
judicial restraint of presidential power, see, for example, Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review
and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1 (1982); P. Allan Dionisopoulos,
New Patterns in Judicial Control of the Presidency: 1950's to 1970's, 10 AKRON L. REv. 1
(1976-77); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 389 (1987); John P. Roche, Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest
for Prerogative, in THE PRESIDENCY 701 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1969); William F. Swindler,
The Supreme Court, the President and Congress, 19 INT'L & CoMn'. L.Q. 671 (1970); H.G.
Peter Wallach, Restraint and Self Restraint: the Presidency and the Courts, 7 CAP. U. L.
REv. 59 (1977-78); Stephen L. Wasby, The Presidency Before the Courts, 6 CAP. U. L.
REv. 35 (1976-77); Raul Robert Tapia et al., Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The
Role of the Courts, I1 HAgv. J. ON LEoIs. 352 (1974).
' Although the Court has not addressed the issue, others in the past have expressed
great skepticism about the ability of the courts to control executive conduct. Three scholars
writing in the 1950s agreed that the courts had little power to restrain the President. Edward
Corwin observed: "Judicial review has been, in fact, of somewhat minor importance in
determining the scope of presidential powers. While the Court has sometimes rebuffed
presidential pretensions, it has more often labored to rationalize them; but most of all it
has sought on one pretext or other to keep its sickle out of this 'dread field."' CORWIN,
supra note 3, at 17-18. Glendon Schubert announced: "It should be perfectly obvious by
now that the most significant aspect of judicial review of presidential orders is its ineffec-
tiveness." SCHUBERT, supra note 3, at 347. Clinton Rossiter concluded: "For most practical
purposes the President may act as if the Supreme Court did not exist.... It is clearly one
of the least reliable restraints on presidential activity." ROssrrER, supra note 3, at 38-40.
See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); infra notes 135-43 and
accompanying text.
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privilege problem in the context of a subpoena duces tecum.6 That
opinion apparently satisfied both litigants and the lower courts that
the President was an approved defendant, and numerous cases
have been filed against President Nixon's successors without oc-
casioning further discussion of the amenability issue by the courts.
7
Although the legal result seems entirely appropriate, the curious
lacuna left in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence raises serious
institutional concerns. One of the Court's primary responsibilities
is the resolution of disputes between the branches of government.
Acting as what Justice Frankfurter called "the mediator of powers
within the federal system," 8 the Court is the final arbiter of the
conflicting authority and privileges claimed by the judiciary and its
coordinate branches. By allowing a result without a rationale, the
Court has abdicated that function in favor of an unarticulated
change in the law of separation of powers. As a consequence, the
lower courts have struggled to evaluate the demands of plaintiffs
seeking relief from the President in light of the special nature of
the presidential office and their own authority to restrain presiden-
tial conduct. This Article analyzes the leading cases concerning the
President's role in the judicial process, 9 reviews the responses of
the lower federal courts, 10 and discusses the implications of the
Court's abdication of its institutional role."
I. LITIGATION AND TH PRESIDENT
A. The President as Witness: United States v. Burr
12
When counsel for John Poindexter and Oliver North subpoe-
naed former President Ronald Reagan to testify at their Iran-
Contra trials and to produce his White House diaries,1 3 it seemed
likely that for the third time in American history members of the
Supreme Court would face a presidential assertion of exemption
6 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-714 (1974).
7See infra part II.
' West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
9 See infra part I.
"0 See infra part II.
" See infra Conclusion.
" 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
" For a useful account of the Iran-Contra prosecutions, see 45 CONG. Q. ALmANAc
551-65 (1989); 46 CONG. Q. ALmANAC 534-35 (1990).
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from furnishing evidentiary material to a federal court. The Reagan
controversy never reached the Supreme Court, but it did reawaken
concerns about the participation of the President in judicial pro-
ceedings, a situation that has not to date been clearly illuminated
by the Supreme Court.
In light of the pervasive role of the President in American
political life, it is surprising that the President has been summoned
so seldom by a court to provide testimony or evidence. 4 Under
the American system of government, the President is subject to
the rule of law and has no constitutional immunity from the
citizens' general duty to assist the courts in the performance of
their judicial duties. Yet, on those few occasions when a President,
current or former, was served with a third party subpoena-Thomas
Jefferson by Aaron Burr, Nixon by the Watergate special prose-
cutor, Reagan by Oliver North and John Poindexter-the resulting
confrontations revealed the chief executive's notable reluctance to
play his part in the judicial process and the judiciary's equally
notable caution in forcing his participation. Of course, each of
these confrontations involved the most sensational political drama
of its day, a motif that may help to explain both the fact that a
President was subpoenaed and the basis for his reluctance to co-
operate. A comparison of the judicial resolutions of the Burr and
Watergate subpoenas reveals the curious ambivalence that sur-
rounds the idea of the President as witness.
The celebrated episode of Aaron Burr's trial for treason bears
some remarkable resemblances to the even more celebrated episode
of the Nixon tapes. In each case, a President resisted a subpoena
duces tecum issued by a federal court in a trial of high political
import and great public interest. In each case, a President was
suspected of placing his own political objectives above the demands
of the judicial process while using the rhetoric of constitutional
prerogative as a screen. And in each case, an opinion by a Chief
Justice denied the President the absolute privilege asserted without
either rejecting or setting firm boundaries for a modified privilege.
In 1807, Aaron Burr was accused of raising an army to lead
against Spain and of conspiring to divide the union; Chief Justice
John Marshall presided over the ensuing trial in his capacity as
,4 For an account of those instances, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-
Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 5 (1975).
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circuit justice. 15 Burr, who had lost the presidential election of 1801
to Jefferson by a single vote, was the target of powerful hostility
from the President and his partisans in the Republican Party.' 6
Jefferson, President and lawyer, had gone so far as to assert to
Congress that of Burr's guilt "there can be no doubt."' 7 Marshall,
Federalist and author of Marbury v. Madison,'8 represented the
independent judiciary that Jefferson denounced as a threat to
liberty and democratic government. Albert J. Beveridge, Marshall's
biographer, called his chapter discussing the trial "Administration
Versus Court," capturing neatly the polarized atmosphere that
preceded the decision by Burr's counsel to subpoena from Jefferson
a letter written to him by General John Wilkinson, the prosecu-
tion's chief witness against Burr, and copies of orders issued to
the Army and Navy concerning Burr's apprehension.' 9
The argument over Burr's motion was hard fought, lasting over
two days. An observer noted that although only a few issues were
addressed, "Much ability and eloquence were displayed by both
sides."' 2 The government's counsel, led by Jefferson's United States
Attorney George Hay,2' first raised a preliminary objection to the
motion for subpoena, on the ground that Burr was not entitled to
the use of process because he had not yet been indicted by the
grand jury.22 Curiously, the government then conceded Burr's right
to serve the President with a subpoena ad testificandum while
balking at the subpoena duces tecum.23 Such a subpoena, the
15 Also sitting with Marshall was Cyrus Griffin, a district court judge. 1 DAVID
ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALs OF Coaorm. AARo N BuRR 112 (photo. reprint 1969)
(1808). Albert J. Beveridge, John Marshall's biographer, observed that Griffin's impact
"throughout the proceedings was negligible." 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, Tam LiFE OF JoHN
MARsHAL. 398 (1919).
16 For an account of Jefferson's political hostility to Burr, see 3 BavERmnE, supra
note 15, at 277-80.
"7 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19 See 3 BEvERmDE, supra note 15, at 398. Marshall concluded that a subpoena for
the military orders should properly be directed not to the President but to "the head of the
department in whose custody the orders are." Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 38.
2 Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 31.
21 Hay was accompanied by William Wirt and Alexander MacRae. 3 BEVERMDGE, supra
note 15, at 407.
2 See Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 32 ("Until the grand jury shall have found a true bill, the
party accused is not entitled to subpoenas .....
23 See id. at 34. Wirt argued:
The counsel for the prosecution do not deny that the general subpoena ad
testificandum, may be issued to summon the president of the United States,
and that he is as amenable to that process as any other citizen. If his public
1991-92]
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government argued, was improper because the President could not
be compelled to disclose confidential communications; further, the
release of those communications, like the Wilkinson letter, might
pose a threat to national security.- The government also disputed
the assertion in Burr's supporting affidavit that the subpoenaed
papers were material to Burr's defense and rejected the claim for
original documents when certified copies were available. 26
Burr's team of defense lawyers27 acknowledged that a subpoena
duces tecum might create a potential national security problem by
asking for sensitive documents but insisted that the President could
raise that problem in his response to the subpoena.28 There was,
however, no basis in law for the government's broader claim of a
presidential privilege for confidential communications. On the issue
of materiality, the defense insisted on the importance of confront-
ing Wilkinson, whose testimony formed the cornerstone of the
prosecution's case, on the witness stand with his original letter.29
The defense also denied that the executive branch had made cer-
tified copies of subpoenaed documents available. 0
functions disable him from obeying the process, that would be a satisfactory
excuse for his non-attendance pro hac vice; but does not go to prove his total
exemption from the process.
I ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 136.
2 See Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 31. MacRae argued for the government that "if a commu-
nication is confidentially made to Thomas Jefferson, he is not bound to appear before this
or any other court, to disclose it." I ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 133. Wirt maintained
"that there may be cases in which the very safety of the state may depend on concealing
the views and operations of the government," and that Wilkinson's letter was such a case.
See 1 id. at 142.
21 In making this argument, Hay relied heavily on the language of Burr's affidavit,
which asserted that Wilkinson's letter "may be material." I ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at
149 (emphasis in original).
26 See l id. at 141.
27 Burr was represented by John Wickham, Edmund Randolph, Benjamin Botts,
Luther Martin, and John Baker. 3 BEvERIoGE, supra note 15, at 407.
21 Wickham argued: "The writ of subpoena duces tecum ought to be issued, and if
there be any state secrets to prevent the production of the letter, the president should allege
it in his return.... ." 1 ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 146. Although Botts insisted that
"[i]n a government of laws, . . . there are but few instances in which the policy of state
secrecy can prevail," he also conceded that parts of the subpoenaed material might be
confidential. See 1 id. at 134. Wickham questioned whether the problem of confidential
material could be addressed by placing "an indorsement on such as the president would
not wish to go out of the court?" I Id. at 121.
See I id. at 147.
10 See Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 31-32. Luther Martin claimed that the defense "did apply
for copies; and were refused under presidential influence." I ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at
128.
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The foregoing summary of the legal arguments presented fails
to capture the passionate delivery and hyperbolic rhetoric of coun-
sel for both sides, recorded in contemporary accounts. Luther
Martin, one of Burr's lawyers, denounced Jefferson for proclaim-
ing Burr's guilt before trial in these terms:
He has assumed to himself the knowledge of the Supreme Being
himself, and pretended to search the heart of my highly respected
friend. He has proclaimed him a traitor in the face of that
country, which has rewarded him. He has let slip the dogs of
war, the hell-hounds of persecution, to hunt down my friend.
31
William Wirt's response for the government was no more re-
strained. He imagined the reaction of a foreigner observing the
conduct of Burr's counsel and the court's tolerance of that conduct:
"It would only be inferred, while they are thus suffered to roll
and luxuriate in these gross invectives against the administration,
that they are furnishing the joys of a Mahometan paradise to the
court as well as to their client." 32 Although Marshall cautioned
counsel that "the gentlemen on both sides had acted improperly
in the style and spirit of their remarks," and urged them to
"confine themselves on every occasion to the point really before
the court, 33 the arguments remained intemperate throughout.
34
Marshall's opinion on the motion is itself a good deal more
temperate than the debate that preceded it. On the preliminary
issue of Burr's right to court process, Marshall concluded that
"[u]pon immemorial usage.., and upon what is deemed a sound
construction of the constitution and the law of the land," an
accused was entitled to compulsory process and thus could sub-
poena witnesses to appear before the grand jury.35 Although the
prosecution had conceded that a subpoena ad testificandum might
11 1 ROBERTsoN, supra note 15, at 128.
32 Id. at 145.
33 Id. at 147-48.
- At one point, Robertson reported that "some warm desultory conversation took
place at the bar." Id. at 117. For other examples of heated rhetoric, see id. at 137 (noting
that Wirt asked on behalf of the government: "Would you expose the offices of state to
be ravaged at the mere pleasure of a prisoner, who, if he feels that he must fall, would
pant for nothing more anxiously than 'to grace his fall and make his ruin glorious,' by
dragging down with him the bright and splendid edifice of the government?") (emphasis in
original); id. at 155 (noting that Randolph described the trial as the "funeral pile of the
prosecution" at which General Wilkinson "is to officiate as the high priest of this human
sacrifice").
11 See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33.
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issue to the President, Marshall felt it important to address that
question nonetheless, and his answer cuts to the core of the relation
of the President to the court.
The starting point for Marshall's analysis was the language of
the Sixth Amendment that assures the accused "compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. '3 6 That language, Marshall
noted, contained "no exception whatever," and therefore only a
person excused by the law of evidence from testifying could be
exempt from the issuance of a subpoena. 37 Is the act of testifying
in court such an affront to the personal dignity of the President
that no subpoena naming him should issue? Marshall answered
this question by comparing the American President with the English
king. The king can do no wrong, while the President may be
impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. The king inherits
his office and "can never be a subject," while the President is
elected for a term and then "returns to the mass of the people
again. ' 38 For Marshall, these selected points illustrated "[h]ow
essentially this difference of circumstances must vary the policy of
the laws of the two countries, in reference to the personal dignity
of the chief executive.
' 39
In his insistence on the distinction between king and President,
Marshall was continuing a line of political argument that permeated
the debates surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Consti-
tution. The prerogatives of the British crown, explained in detail
by Blackstone, were familiar to the Framers and their contempo-
raries as a form of executive authority to be avoided in the creation
of the new republic 0 As set forth by Blackstone, these prerogatives
constituted the royal dignity that set the king apart from his
subjects "by ascribing to him certain qualities, as inherent in his
royal capacity, distinct from and superior to those of any other
individual in the nation. ' 41 The king possessed both "sovereignty,
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37 See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34.
3 Id.
39 Id.
-' Blackstone was among the legal sources read and cited by the colonists. See, e.g.,
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CEATION OF THE AMimcAN Rmuauc, 1776-1787, at 7, 14 (1969).
When the colonists drafted their state constitutions, they were at pains to reject the executive
prerogatives possessed by the British crown. Id. at 135-37. Notably, when Blackstone was
first published in America in 1771, John Marshall's father was one of the original subscri-
bers, and according to Beveridge, "Thomas Marshall saw to it that his son read Blackstone
as carefully as circumstances permitted." 1 BE ERIEDE, supra note 15, at 56.
41 1 WILiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *241.
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or pre-eminence," 42 and "absolute perfection; '43 as a ruler he
possessed as well "absolute immortality," surviving politically the
deaths of the individuals who wore the crown. 44 Blackstone con-
cluded that "[iln the exertion, therefore, of these prerogatives,
which the law has given him, the king is irresistible and absolute,
according to the forms of the constitution." 45
The royal prerogatives furnished the king with protections una-
vailable to any of his subjects. As a consequence of his pre-
eminence, no legal action could be brought against the king in any
of his own courts: "For all jurisdiction implies superiority of
power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without an au-
thority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contempt-
ible, unless that court had power to command the execution of it:
but, who, says Finch, shall command the king?" 46 As a conse-
quence of his perfection, "The king can do no wrong." 47 Thus, in
the political sphere, error by the government "is not to be imputed
to the king, nor is he answerable for it personally to his people." 4
The king, then, enjoyed both legal and political immunity from
the ordinary processes of correction and retribution. Blackstone
was, however, at pains to explain that the British constitution
provided some recourse to the king's subjects. For private injuries,
they could seek discretionary relief in the court of chancery;49 for
public harms, the king's counsellors could be indicted and im-
peached.50 There was, however, no possibility under the British
constitution of an accused traitor, someone in Burr's situation,
issuing a subpoena to the king for material relevant to his defense.
The idea that the President of the United States, unlike the
English king, would be both accountable and subject to the rule
of law recurred throughout the convention debates. Delegates re-
peatedly countered proposals for the structure and powers of the
42 2 id.
43 2 id. at *246.
4 2 id. at *249 ("mhe King never dies, Henry, Edward, or George may die; but the
King survives them all.").
41 2 id. at *251.
42 id. at *242. The basis for the rule that the king cannot be sued was "the wider
principle that the King cannot against his will be made to submit to the jurisdiction of the
King's courts." ALBERT DicEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTI-
TUTrON 527 (1945).
"2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at *246.
4" 2 id.
41 See 2 id. at *243.
-1 See 2 id. at *244.
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national executive with the objection that such proposals might
create what Edmund Randolph of Virginia termed "the foetus of
a Monarchy. ' 5 Although some delegates praised the British gov-
ernment-Alexander Hamilton called it "the best model the world
ever produced" 52-there was a strong sense that the unchecked
privileges and powers of its king were antithetical to the goals of
American society.53 Thus, the new American Constitution con-
tained numerous provisions designed to limit the power of the
President 5 4 but even these structural and functional checks were
not deemed sufficient. In the impeachment provision of the Con-
stitution,5 the delegates found a method of restraint they believed
11  MAX FARRAN, THE REcoRDs OF TEm F ERAL CoNvE-noN OF 1787, 92 (1911).
Randolph favored a three person executive body over a unitary executive. Other delegates
also criticized proposals that resembled monarchies. George Mason considered a single
executive to be a "more dangerous monarchy, an elective one." 1 id. at 101. Elbridge Gerry
believed "'Ithere were not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not agst. every
approach towards Monarchy." 1 id. at 425. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania styled
himself "as little a friend to monarchy as any gentleman." I id. at 35. Hugh Williamson
of North Carolina argued that a single magistrate "will be an elective king, and will feel
the spirit of one." 1 id. at 101. Randolph continued his objections to a single executive
throughout the debates and ultimately refused to sign the completed Constitution. See I id.
at 644-49. For other comments by Randolph, see, for example, 1 FAAND at 74 (a single
executive would "savor too much of a monarchy"); 1 id. at 88 (the "permanent temper of
the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy"); 3 id. at 278 (the people will
see in the President "the form at least of a little monarch"). Mason also insisted, at the
close of the convention, that the form of government adopted "would end either in
monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy." 2 id. at 632. Mason, like Randolph, did not sign
the final draft. For his explanation of his decision to Jefferson, see 3 id. at 304-05.
,2 1 id. at 299. Hamilton's praise of the British government as a model for the new
nation apparently inspired a rumor that he favored a monarchy. See I id. at 288 n.6. For
an exchange between Hamilton and Timothy Pickering on the subject of the rumor, see 3
id. at 397-98.
53 Charles Pinckney, for example, argued that despite its virtues the British constitution
"can not possibly be introduced into our System-that its balance between the Crown &
the people can not be made a part of our Constitution." 1 id. at 398. For an extended
comparison of the powers of the British king and the powers of the President under the
new constitution, see Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, May 5, 1788, in 3 id. at
301-02. Although Butler detailed what he called "a material difference" between the two
governments, with the American system giving substantially more power to the people, he
also noted that the President's powers in the completed draft were greater than he had
intended and therefore a potential source of danger. See 3 id. at 302.
'4 According to George Bancroft, "The convention was anxious to reconcile a discreet
watchfulness over the executive with his independence." 2 GEORGE BANCROFt, HisTORY OF
THE FoRAnxoN OF Tm CoNsMsnIoN OF TnE UNrTED STATES OF AmERICA 188 (1883).
Examples of this attempted reconciliation clearly exist in the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the President to make treaties with the concurrence
of two-thirds of the Senate and to nominate ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, and
other government officials with the advice and consent of the Senate).
SS U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 4, cls. 6-7 (granting Senate the power of impeachment). For
[VOL. 80
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sufficient to prevent the President from overreaching his authority.
The British constitution might be founded on the proposition that
the king can do no wrong, but the American Constitution coolly
contemplates the possibility of a President, acting out of ambition
or corruption, doing a great deal of wrong and warranting the
strong sanction of removal from office.
5 6
Marshall's opinion in Burr reflects the same insistence on the
subjection of the President to the processes that implement the rule
of law. Burr's subpoena struck precisely at the heart of the new
American government by asserting that a federal judge could order
the President to assist in the collection of evidence to put before
a grand jury. Writing for the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Ma-
dison, Marshall had insisted on judicial authority to review exec-
utive branch conduct but nonetheless suggested special treatment
for the President by the courts:
An idea has gone forth, that a mandamus to a secretary of state
is equivalent to a mandamus to the President of the United States.
I declare it to be my opinion, grounded on a comprehensive view
of the subject, that the president is not amenable to any court of
debate concerning the need for an impeachment provision, see, for example, I FARRAND,
supra note 51, at 86 (noting Mason's argument that "[s]ome mode of displacing an unfit
magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by
the corruptibility of the man chosen"); Z id. at 64 (noting North Carolina representative
William Davie's description of an impeachment provision "as an essential security for the
good behaviour of the Executive").
m For Alexander Hamilton, the test of an appropriate executive was whether it
combined "the requisites to energy" with "the requisites to safety, in a republican sense,-
a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?" Tn FEDERAuST No. 77 (Alexander
Hamilton). Refuting critics of the Constitution who had characterized the new President as
possessing "more than royal prerogatives," id., No. 67, Hamilton constructed an extended
comparison of the powers of king and President. The king is an hereditary monarch while
the President holds elective office for a limited term of years; the king is immune from any
punishment while the President is subject to both impeachment and the regular processes
of the law; the king has an absolute veto over parliamentary acts while the President's veto
may be overridden by two-thirds of the legislature; the king commands the nation's military
forces and may declare war while the President's command of the militia is subject to
legislation and to Congress's power to declare war; the king may dissolve Parliament at
will while the President may adjourn Congress only in the event of internal disagreement;
the king makes treaties and appoints government officials independently, while the President
may do so only with the support of the Senate. Id., No. 69. In each instance, the power
of the President is qualified by the governmental power of the legislative and judicial
branches or by the elective power of the people. What answer, Hamilton asks, should be
given to those claiming a likeness of king and President? "The same that ought to be given
to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands
of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a
despotism." Id.
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judicature for the exercise of his high functions, but is responsible
only in the mode pointed out in the constitution.
7
Marshall also admitted in his Burr opinion that originally "the
court felt some doubt concerning the propriety" of issuing a sub-
poena to the President and ordering the introduction in court of
his nonpublic papers, but despite this initial reluctance Marshall
found "no legal objection to issuing a subpoena duces tecum to
any person whatever, provided the case be such as to justify the
process. 58 The propriety, Marshall insisted, "must depend on the
character of the paper, not on the character of the person who
holds it.'5
9
This sweeping language did not, however, emerge unqualified
from the opinion. Marshall recognized two restraints on the reach
of the court's subpoena power into the President's office. First,
Marshall conceded that the demands of the President's official
duties might make a subpoena unduly burdensome. Although he
dryly noted that "this demand is not unremitting"-an observation
that enraged Jefferson6°-Marshall saw the distraction of the Pres-
ident from national matters as a reason for declining to obey a
subpoena rather than for failing to issue one.61 Second, Marshall
acknowledged that a subpoena duces tecum might seek papers that
would "endanger the public safety," and that such material "if it
be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will, of
course, be suppressed. ' 62 Neither claim, however, served to distin-
guish the President from any other proposed recipient of process.
In Marshall's formulation, the court, by issuing a subpoena, could
assert its own authority without in any way treading on the Pres-
ident's dignity. Marshall deferred for a more suitable occasion the
more difficult question of how to evaluate a presidential response
to a subpoena claiming danger to the public safety in light of the
applicability of the subpoenaed material to the issue before the
court.
That occasion, or at least an approximation of it, surfaced
later in Burr's trial, when the defense sought to submit in evidence
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 149 (1803).
$urr, 25 F. Cas. at 35.
19 Id. at 34.
61 See 3 BEvERmGE, supra note 15, at 445, 455-56.
61 See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34. Marshall noted that a court can protect the President
"from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas" by its conduct after rather
than before issuance. See id.
Id. at 37.
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the original of the letter from General Wilkinson 3 Jefferson had
sent the letter to Hay, with instructions that Hay exercise his
discretion regarding its release, and Hay insisted that certain pas-
sages should not be made public.64 Burr and his counsel responded
that the defendant was entitled to the entire letter as evidence
material to his defense. In resolving the issue, Marshall rejected
the prosecution's argument while expressing greater deference to
the President than in his earlier ruling.
Although he did not retreat from his position that the President
could be "subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required
to produce any paper in his possession," Marshall offered several
qualifications on the court's treatment of the President.65 First, he
conceded that the President "may have sufficient motives for de-
clining to produce a particular paper, and those motives may be
such as to restrain the court from enforcing its production."66 In
evaluating such situations, the court must necessarily rely on the
President's representations concerning the propriety of production.
Second, in the most quoted passage of the opinion, he observed
that "[iun no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed
against the president as against an ordinary individual." 67 Although
Marshall did not describe at length the distinctions in treatment he
6, Two different letters were at issue in Marshall's two decisions. The first letter was
dated October 21, 1806. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31. The second was dated November 12,
1806. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Burr
II). Both letters apparently described the activities on which the charge of treason was
based. At the time of the second attempt to secure production of a Wilkinson letter, the
charge of treason had been dismissed by the court, and Burr stood accused only of the
misdemeanor of "setting on foot, and providing the means of, a military expedition against
the dominions or territory of the king of Spain." Id. at 187. For the text of Marshall's
celebrated opinion on the doctrine of constructive treason, see United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
6" See 2 ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 511-12. After Burr's counsel declined Hay's
offer to review the letter privately, Marshall issued a subpoena duces tecum to Hay. Hay
responded to the subpoena by deleting passages from the letter and offering to let the court
verify the prosecution's contention that those passages were not material to Burr's defense.
Burr, however, continued to insist personally and through counsel on presentation of the
entire letter. See 2 id. at 513-14. Prior to the issuance of the subpoena, Burr even went so
far as to argue that "the president was in contempt, and that he had a right to demand
process of contempt against him." 2 Id. at 504. Hay and his cocounsel continued to argue
that the President could delegate his right to determine which portions of the letter should
be withheld in the public interest. See, e.g., 2 id. at 520 (MacRae stating, "The attorney
... is to be regarded in the same view as the president would be if he were standing here
and called on to divulge the letter in question.").
6 See Burr II, 25 F. Cas. at 191.
" Id.
67 Id. at 192.
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envisioned, he did specify two relevant factors: First, the party
seeking the document must clearly establish its materiality; and,
second, the President must exercise the discretion to withhold the
document himself and not delegate it to a subordinate. 68 Jefferson,
however, had offered no basis for the decision to withhold the
letter and in fact had allowed Hay to exercise his own discretion.
At the same time, the defense continued to insist on the materiality
of the letter. Marshall therefore concluded that the letter must be
produced.6 9
Wilkinson's letter might have generated a third and more de-
tailed ruling from Marshall, but circumstances conspired to dis-
appoint students of executive privilege. Although Jefferson
attempted to force Marshall's hand by sending his own certificate
claiming exemption for portions of the letter,70 Marshall's subse-
quent ruling on the inadmissibility of crucial government evidence
in turn forced the prosecution to abandon the case against Burr in
the Virginia court.71 Marshall never assessed the claims made per-
sonally by Jefferson for withholding portions of the Wilkinson
letter from the defense.
The result of the Burr trial, then, is a precedent combining
strong general principles with clearly marked escape routes. Like
68 Id.
69 Marshall was willing to protect the portions of the letter the prosecution wished to
remain confidential. Although he felt that Burr should review the letter himself, Marshall
indicated that "if it should be thought proper" he would order that "no copy of it be
taken for public exhibition, and that no use shall be made of it but what is necessarily
attached to the case." Id. During argument, even Burr's counsel conceded that the public
interest might require that some materials be withheld. See, e.g., 2 ROBERTSON, supra note
15, at 513 (Wickham arguing that the letter could be withheld only if the President asserted
that it contained state secrets); id. at 524 (Burr conceding that when disclosure of documents
"would be mischievous to great national interests,... the constitutional officer has a right
to withhold them, for a time, from the public view").
70 See Burr 1I, 25 F. Cas. at 193. Beveridge reports: "For some reason the matter
was not again pressed. Perhaps the favorable progress of the case relieved Burr's anxiety."
3 BEvairDoE, supra note 15, at 522 n.4.
7' Marshall ruled, inter alia, that Burr's acts performed in a judicial district outside
Virginia could not be admitted. For a summary of Marshall's ruling, see Burr II, 25 F.
Cas. at 201. The prosecution moved to discharge the jury, but the court denied the motion
in the absence of Burr's consent. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. See id.
The issue of the Wilkinson letter did arise once more, on a motion to commit Burr
for trial in another jurisdiction. With General Wilkinson on the witness stand, Burr once
again sought production of the unedited letter, this time from Wilkinson himself. Although
there is no published opinion, a contemporary reporter noted that Marshall refused to
require Wilkinson to produce the parts of the letter that the President had withheld unless
Burr presented sufficient evidence of their relevance. See Edwin S. Rhodes, From Burr to
Nixon, 35 FED. B.J. 218, 222-23 (1976-77). For Rhodes's account of the passages withheld
by Jefferson, see id. at 224.
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all citizens, the President is subject to a court's process and may
be compelled to testify or to produce documents in court. At the
same time, the demands of office and the public interest make it
inappropriate for a court to treat the President as "an ordinary
individual." Marshall acknowledged that the conflicting claims of
a defendant and the President may confront a court with a difficult
situation, but he concluded that "I cannot precisely lay down any
general rule for such a case."' 72 Instead, he outlined the relevant
factors for a court to weigh in deciding whether to compel conduct
by the President. Rather than taking a purely egalitarian stand,
Marshall arrived at a pragmatic compromise. The broad and ab-
solute prerogatives of the British king are replaced by the narrow
and contingent prerogatives of the President. Neither outside the
law nor inescapably within its grasp, the President occupies a
position of indeterminate privilege that the courts may either rec-
ognize or reject.7 1
B. The President as Defendant: Mississippi v. Johnson7 4
The question of presidential exemption from judicial process
first came before the full Supreme Court some sixty years after
Aaron Burr's trial,75 again in a highly political context, when the
state of Mississippi sought to enjoin President Andrew Johnson
from enforcing the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. The opinion in
Mississippi v. Johnson, as in United States v. Burr, was written
by a Chief Justice, this time Salmon Chase. Writing for a unani-
7 Burr 11, 25 F. Cas. at 192.
73 It is not surprising that scholars have reached different conclusions about Marshall's
opinions. Compare Rhodes, supra note 71, at 218 (arguing that it was Marshall's position
"that the withholding of confidential communications in the public interest rests solely in
the discretion of the executive") with RAouL BERGER, ExncuTnrv PRVLEGE 191 (1974)
(arguing that "Marshall asserted judicial power to decide whether a presidential claim of
privilege had merit, and that a claim of secrecy in the 'public interest' would have to yield
to the necessities of the accused"). For a detailed examination of Marshall's rulings, see
Raoul Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111-22 (1973-
74).
74 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1868).
7 Marshall, sitting as circuit justice in Virginia, faced another challenge to President
Jefferson when, in 1811, he heard a case of trespass filed by Edward Livingston against
Jefferson in connection with conduct during his term in office affecting property in New
Orleans. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (1811) (No. 8,411). Both Marshall's opinion
and that of district Judge Tyler resolved the case against Livingston on the grounds that
trespass is a local action and can be brought only in the jurisdiction where the land is
located. Neither opinion referred at any point to the propriety of suing a former President
for actions taken while in office.
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mous Court, Chase held that a state could not sue the President
to block the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute.
7 6
Chase relied primarily on the doctrine of separation of powers to
reach the Court's result, and his opinion seemed much less inter-
ested in the extent of presidential power than in the relation be-
tween branches of government. Although Mississippi v. Johnson
has been cited often, it is almost invariably invoked to support a
point either broader or narrower than its actual holding, which is
in fact compatible with Marshall's position in Burr.
Arguing for Mississippi, W.L. Sharkey relied expressly on Mar-
shall's opinion in Burr to support his view that there was no legal
or constitutional obstacle to a suit to enjoin the President. The
injunction sought in the case, Sharkey claimed, was simply the
inverse of the subpoena sought by Burr. One order would restrain
the President from acting, while the other would compel him to
act. According to Sharkey, "The principle is the same in the two
cases, as well as the means of coercing obedience; and the reasoning
of Chief Justice Marshall reaches and settles the question now
before the court. '"77 Echoing Marshall's statement that the right to
a subpoena "must depend on the character of the paper, not on
the character of the person who holds it," 78 Sharkey argued fur-
ther: "The case is the criterion, no matter who is plaintiff or who
defendant; and if the President be exempt from the process of the
law, he is above the law." ' 79 Sharkey's cocounsel, R.J. Walker,
cited at length in his argument Marshall's comparison of king and
President" to support Mississippi's position that the President en-
joyed no special privileges. Had Jefferson failed to obey the sub-
poena, Walker argued, Marshall would clearly have had the
authority to issue an attachment for contempt. 81 Thus, the Supreme
Court should follow Marshall's lead in holding the President sub-
ject as well to an injunction.
76 The case came before the Court as a motion to file a bill, a motion generally
granted as a matter of course. After Attorney General Stanbery objected that the bill was
an improper one because it named the President, the Court agreed to hear argument on the
limited question of whether the state of Mississippi could file its bill. See Mississippi v.
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 478 (1868). For an account of the court proceedings and
their report in the press, see CHAiEs FAMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88
(1971).
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 479.
78 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34.
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 479.
8See id. at 493.
91 See id. at 493-94.
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Attorney General Stanbery responded to Mississippi's argument
by proclaiming that Marshall had made "a very great error" in
holding the President subject to a subpoena.82 Most dramatically,
Stanbery rejected Marshall's comparison of President and king in
categorical terms:
I deny that there is a particle less dignity belonging to the office
of President than to the office of King of Great Britain or of
any other potentate on the face of the earth. He represents the
majesty of the law and of the people as fully and as essentially,
and with the same dignity, as does any absolute monarch or the
head of any independent government in the world.... It is on
account of the office that he holds that I say the President of
the United States is above the process of any court or the juris-
diction of any court to bring him to account as President.83
To accept Marshall's position, Stanbery argued, would be to set
foot upon a slippery slope that would lead from a President's
principled refusal to comply with a subpoena, to the court's issu-
ance of a quasi-criminal attachment for contempt, to the eventual
imprisonment-and de facto removal from office-of the President
for failure to accept the court's authority.84 Thus, only by impeach-
ment could the President be held accountable for his performance
in office, and only after impeachment resulting in removal could
the President be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts.85
Both sides thus found in United States v. Burr and its oppo-
sition of royal prerogative to presidential power the precedent that,
depending on the advocate, illuminated either the wisdom or the
folly flowing from Marshall's vision of the relation of President
to court. In resolving the issue before the Supreme Court, however,
the Chief Justice avoided any mention of Burr or presidential
privilege. Instead, Chase focused on another point of disagreement
between the parties: whether the President's conduct in enforcing
the Reconstruction Acts was ministerial and thus within Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison16 or discretionary and thus outside
Marbury's reach.
12 See id. at 483.
-Id. at 484.
" Id. at 485-87.
1 See id. at 484-85, 491.
" In Marbury, Marshall had carefully distinguished between the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to the Secretary of State and to the President. See supra text accompanying note
57. Chase also cited Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), another case
authorizing judicial enforcement of ministerial conduct by an official -of the executive
branch. See Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 491.
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Chase was careful, at the outset of his opinion, to exclude the
larger questions that had engaged counsel for both parties:
We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the
objection, without expressing any opinion on the broader issues
discussed in argument, whether, in any case, the President of the
United States may be required, by the process of this court, to
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be
held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for
crime.
8 7
He then framed the issue for decision as narrowly as the facts
permitted: "[Clan the President be restrained by injunction from
carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitu-
tional?" 8 Chase's opinion deflected attention from the President
himself to his conduct. In enforcing the Reconstruction Acts, the
President, acting as Commander in Chief, would be appointing
generals to exercise governmental authority in the newly created
military districts of the south and supervising their performance.
Such an exercise of the presidential duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed was "purely executive and political. 8 9 It fell
outside the definition of a ministerial duty, "a simple, definite
duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and
imposed by law." 9 In the opinion's only reference to John Mar-
shall, Chase noted that any attempt by the Court to enforce such
executive duties would be, "in the language of Chief Justice Mar-
shal [sic], 'an absurd and excessive extravagance. ' 9'
Chase's primary concern was defining the power of the Court
rather than confining the power of the President. His slippery slope
led not to the unseemly spectacle of an imprisoned President but
to dangerous confrontations among the three branches of govern-
ment. If the President chose to obey the Court's injunction, then
Congress might impeach him for failing to execute the laws; if the
Court then intervened to protect the President, it would be inter-
fering with the Senate's judicial responsibilities. 92 The formula that
Chase offered served at once to assert and to restrain the Court's
authority:
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498.
ss Id.
81 Id. at 499.
70 Id. at 498.
9, Id. at 499.
92 Id. at 500-01.
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[Tihe Congress is the legislative department of the government;
the President is the executive department. Neither can be re-
strained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts
of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance. 9
Although the opinion did not specify what those proper cases might
be, Johnson made clear the Court's position that its refusal to
entertain Mississippi's bill was a matter of jurisdiction rather than
discretion.Y In Burr, Marshall insisted on judicial authority to
subpoena the President, deferring to a later stage in the proceedings
the evaluation of the President's reasons for refusing to comply
Here, however, Chase declined at the threshold the invitation to
extend the Court's authority to presidential conduct. His distinction
between ministerial and discretionary actions has proved a durable
one, and his concern over separation of powers valid. The opinion
carefully avoids, however, any countervailing language suggesting,
as Marshall did, the precept, central to American political theory,
that the President is subject to the rule of law The message of
Chase's opinion is that the President cannot under most circum-
stances be held accountable in the courts for Ins conduct in office.
Without mentioning Burr, Johnson largely circumscribed its au-
thority
In the years since its issuance, Johnson has become a standard
case citation for the distinction between ministerial and discretion-
ary conduct by the executive branch.95 It has also become a source
for what the Supreme Court has called "the general principles
which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of executive
discretion."' 6 More broadly, however, Johnson came to stand for
91 Id. at 500.
9' "But we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received
by us." Id. at 501. Chase also noted that if the President disobeyed its injunction, "the
court is without power to enforce its process." Id.
See, e.g., Winsor v. Hunt, 243 P 407, 411 (Arm. 1926); State v. Staub, 23 A. 924,
927 (Conn. 1892); Dunagan v. Stadler, 29 S.E. 440, 440 (Ga. 1897); Nagle v. Wakey, 43
N.E. 1079, 1082 (III. 1896) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 353 (1869); see also Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("The duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed
cannot be brought under legal compulsion.") (citing Johnson). Because Johnson links
together discretionary and political conduct by the executive, it is also cited as authority
for the Court's refusal to hear political questions. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496 (1971) (noting that the Court will not entertain "original actions
that seek to embroil this tribunal in "political questions.") (citing Johnson).
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the invulnerability of the President to judicial command, 97 and
courts cited it regularly for that proposition. 98 Although Chase
expressly declined to answer that larger question, his opinion ap-
parently discouraged litigants from bringing it to the Court for
later resolution. Yet nothing in the holding of the case precluded
courts from either enjoining the President to perform a purely
ministerial duty or entertaining suits against the President for non-
injunctive relief. Some eighty-five years later, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer99, the most important pre-Watergate chal-
lenge to presidential conduct, carried forward the legacy of John-
son in two respects: The plaintiffs assumed that their suit could
not be brought directly against President Harry S. Truman, and
91 The political scientist Glendon Schubert, writing in 1957, made the point emphati-
cally:
It is accepted as a political and legal fact today that the President of the
United States is immune from prospective control by the judiciary. The prin-
cipal reason for this is the President's power of direction over the Department
of Justice and other national police agencies, and his position as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces: therefore, he cannot be forced to accept service
of legal process. Certainly, no positive law grants him this immunity, nor does
it necessarily follow from his legal or political status. Neither was it the
understanding or intent of many of the principal participants in the Philadel-
phia Convention that he alone, of all the one hundred and sixty million people
of the United States today, should enjoy personal immunities appertaining
elsewhere in the Western state system only to reigning monarchs like the Queen
of the United Kingdom.... Therefore, the principle of presidential immunity
from judicial process is not a constitutional rule, but a judicial one, based
primarily upon the decisions of judges who were brought face to face with
the brute fact that they could not coerce the President.
SCHuBERT, supra note 3, at 318-19. Chase did note in Johnson: "If the President refuse
obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process."
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 500-01. The difficulties of enforcement also worried William
Howard Taft. See TAs-r, supra note 3, at 115; see also ScHIsnSo'aa, supra note 3, at 70
(agreeing with Corwin that the courts cannot compel the President to perform his respon-
sibilities or to refrain from exceeding his powers).
9, See, e.g., National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees v. Nixon, 349 F. Supp.
18, 22 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding lack of jurisdiction over the President because "It]he fun-
damental doctrine of separation-of-powers dictates this result, and it has been settled since
the case of State of Mississippi v. Johnson") (citation omitted), rev'd, 492 F.2d 587 (2d
Cir. 1974); Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction over the President because "[t]he executive power is vested in the
President by Article II of the United States Constitution, and judicial interference in the
exercise of that power is extremely limited, if not constitutionally prohibited, in order to
preserve the separation of powers within the Federal government. State of Mississippi v.
Johnson.") (footnote and citation omitted); see also San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (dismissing an action against the President
without citing Johnson but noting that "a long standing policy, if not a positive rule, has
avoided such an intragovernmental confrontation").
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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the Supreme Court accepted their assumption by producing seven
opinions without a single mention of the propriety of naming the
President as a defendant.
C. The Presidential Proxy: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer0o
The Youngstown litigation began when President Truman, un-
able to resolve a wage dispute between the country's steel compa-
nies and their employees' union, moved to prevent a threatened
strike and maintain production by issuing an executive order di-
recting Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the nation's
steel mills. 10 1 In a federal action for injunctive relief that named
Sawyer as the sole defendant, the companies challenged the Presi-
dent's power to seize the mills in the absence of congressional
authorization. Judge Pine of the district court agreed, issuing a
preliminary injunction against the defendant's continued seizure
and possession of the mills.12 After the court of appeals stayed
the injunction,103 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set an
early date for argument.3 4 Its opinions in Youngstown-six by
members of the majority and one in dissent-explored exhaustively
the nature of presidential power under the Constitution and the
relationship among the three branches of government before ruling
that President Truman lacked the authority to issue his executive
order. The Court did not, however, address the underlying issues
of the President's amenability to suit and the significance of nam-
ing a cabinet officer instead of the President as defendant.
The central issue raised by Youngstown was the existence and
extent of presidential power to seize private property without spe-
cific constitutional or congressional authority to meet a perceived
"o 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
M01 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952). Truman
had referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board, but the Board was unable
to arrange a settlement. See id. For a thorough examination of the Youngstown episode,
see MABvA MARcus, TRuA AND Tm STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE Luars oF PREsnrENTIL
POWER (1977).
"1 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1952),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
101 Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
101 Certiorari was granted on May 3 and argument scheduled for May 12. See Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 584.
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national emergency. 105 The parties identified as a corollary, how-
ever, the question of whether a suit against the President was either
possible or proper. In his argument before the district court, As-
sistant Attorney General Holmes Baldridge relied on Mississippi v.
Johnson as the sole precedent for his expansive position that the
judicial branch lacked authority to hold the President or any of
his agents accountable for executive conduct.Ie 6 John J. Wilson,
counsel for Youngstown Sheet and Tube, countered that Mississippi
v. Johnson did not establish "the blanket, absolute rule" Baldridge
described.107 In granting preliminary injunctions against Sawyer,
Judge Pine was careful to distinguish Youngstown from Mississippi
v. Johnson on the ground that in the case before the court the
President had not been sued and was not an indispensable party
to the action. 10 8 Citing Supreme Court authority, Judge Pine ruled
that "officers of the Executive Branch of the government may be
enjoined when their conduct is unauthorized by statute, exceeds
the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to unconsti-
tutional enactment."'' 9 The opinion did not respond directly to
Wilson's point or offer any further observations on the amenability
of the President to suit, but it did implicitly rebuke Baldridge for
his argument of executive invulnerability by finding the defendant's
cabinet status "no bar to plaintiff's claim to relief."110
10, For discussions of the Court's holding in Youngstown and the implications of its
seven opinions, see ScHwARTz, supra note 3, at 62-67; Edwin S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure
Case: A Judicial Brick without Straw, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 53 (1953); Paul G. Kauper, The
Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 MicH. L..R-v. 141
(1952).
,06 H.R. Doc. No. 534, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 372, 379-80 (1952). Although Baldridge
maintained that the government's position did not "rest primarily upon the question of the
immunity of the President from suit," id. at 378, he nonetheless insisted that Sawyer was
the "alter ego" of the President and thus enjoyed the same immunity that was afforded
the President. See id. at 362, 380. More dramatically, Baldridge argued that there were only
two checks on executive power: "One is the ballot box and the other is impeachment." Id.
at 371. In response to questions from Judge Pine, Baldridge agreed that he read the
Constitution to limit the power of the legislative and judicial branches but not the executive
branch. See id. at 377.
107 See id. at 399-400. Wilson had faced the issue earlier, when the parties argued
before Judge Holtzoff on plaintiffs' claim for a temporary restraining order. Judge Holtzoff
specifically asked Bruce Broniley, counsel for Bethlehem Steel Company, whether he was
not in fact seeking a restraining order against the President and whether the court had
authority to issue such an order. See id. at 246. After Bromley insisted that the court could
enjoin the President, see id. at 247, Wilson expressed doubt on that point but argued that
Mississippi v. Johnson should be limited to situations involving "personal action against
the person of the Chief Executive himself." Id. at 249.
,08 See Youngstown, 103 F. Supp. at 576.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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In the wake of Judge Pine's ruling, the parties adjusted their
positions on presidential immunity in their briefs to the Supreme
Court. The plaintiffs now echoed the district court in arguing that
their suit was not brought against the President"' and that Missis-
sippi v. Johnson did not apply to suits brought against presidential
subordinates. 1 2 The defendant, in contrast, muted his earlier insis-
tence on complete executive immunity. Mississippi v. Johnson was
cited only once in the government's brief, in a footnote, and no
longer was part of Baldridge's sweeping claim of judicial impo-
tence. Instead, the government urged the ambiguity of the law on
injunctions against department heads, concluding "that the issue
is sufficiently uncertain and delicate as to constitute a compelling
reason for leaving the plaintiffs to their legal remedy for dam-
ages.""' At oral argument, John W. Davis, representing the plain-
tiffs, emphasized the separation of powers issue and constitutional
restraints on executive power; Solicitor General Philip Perlman,
representing Sawyer, emphasized the international situation that
had prompted the President's action and reviewed prior presidential
seizures.' 14
When the Court issued its decision less than three weeks after
oral argument," 5 the majority opinion by Justice Black identified
two issues to be resolved: whether the case was ripe for full review
on the basis of a preliminary injunction, and whether the seizure
of the steel mills was within the President's constitutional powers." 6
At no point in the majority opinion or in any of the separate
opinions that accompanied it did any member of the Court raise
the issue that had troubled the district court in the earlier stages
of the case: whether this was in fact a suit against the President,
and, if so, under what circumstances such litigation was permissi-
"I See H.R. Doc. No. 534, supra note 106, at 668. The point was made in the joint
brief filed by counsel for Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Republic Steel, Armco Steel,
Bethlehem Steel, Jones & Laughlin Steel, United States Steel, and E.J. Lavino & Company.
It was repeated in a separate brief filed by counsel for Armco Steel and Sheffield Steel.
See id. at 940.
"I See id. at 674-75. The brief also argued that the Court did not need to reach the
issue of the judicial power to enjoin the President directly. See id. at 670.
"I Id. at 760-61 n.40. The shift in position may in part be explained by a shift in
personnel. Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General Philip Perlman signed the defen-
dant's brief and argued before the Supreme Court. For a critical assessment of Baldridge's
performance before Judge Pine, see MAcus, supra note 101, at 117-26.
"1 See MAitcus, supra note 101, at 167-74.
"' See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579. The argument took place on May 12 and 13;
the Court issued its decision on June 2.
,,6 See id. at 584.
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ble. 17 The language of all the opinions makes clear that the Justices
viewed the case as one of presidential rather than delegated au-
thority; Charles Sawyer, the named defendant, was very much the
forgotten man." 8 The Justices made the natural assumption that
as Secretary of Commerce, Sawyer would implement the orders he
received from the President. They did not, however, reflect on the
implications of Sawyer's presumed transparency: If a cabinet of-
ficer acts simply to implement presidential orders, then in what
sense is a suit against that officer anything other than a suit against
the President?
There is, of course, a direct connection between the issue the
Court addressed and the issue it deflected. As Marshall saw so
clearly in Burr, a chief executive whose power is limited by the
terms of the Constitution should enjoy no automatic unwritten
exemption from the judicial processes basic to the rule of law. Of
all the members of the Youngstown Court, Justice Jackson was
the only one to follow Marshall in tying his analysis of presidential
power to the Framers' rejection of the royal prerogative. Noting
the Framers' exposure to the exercise of that prerogative by George
III and its description in the Declaration of Independence, Jackson
observed that such history "leads me to doubt that they were
creating their new Executive in his image." 9 Yet none of the
opinions, including Jackson's, cited Burr or linked the Court's
concern with the boundaries of presidential power to the idea of a
President personally accountable within the legal system for his
17 In his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Reed and Minton, Chief
Justice'Vinson observed: "[W]e assume that defendant Charles Sawyer is not immune from
judicial restraint and that plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief if we find that the
Executive Order under which defendant acts is unconstitutional." Id. at 677-78. There is
no further discussion of the point.
I For example, Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion that "[i]t is
not a pleasant judicial duty to find that the President has exceeded his powers." Id. at 614.
Also, Chief Justice Vinson concluded in dissent that the judiciary "must independently
determine for itself whether the President was acting, as required by the Constitution, to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' Id. at 709 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3).
... Id. at 641. Jackson also ended his concurring opinion by comparing the role of the
Court in ruling against the President with the efforts of the British judiciary to subject the
king to the rule of law:
We follow the judicial tradition instituted on a memorable Sunday in 1612,
when King James took offense at the independence of his judges and, in rage,
declared: "Then I am to be under the law-which it is treason to affirm."
Chief Justice Coke replied to his King: "Thus wrote Bracton, 'The King ought
not to be under any man, but he is under God and the Law."'
Id. at 655 n.27 (citations omitted).
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exercise of that power. All of the Justices, including the three
dissenters, agreed that it is the role of the Court to review the
constitutionality of presidential conduct, but none anchored the
exercise of judicial review in the plaintiff's right to invoke the legal
system as a route to that review.
What Youngstown did establish, however obliquely, was the
validity of a useful legal fiction. After Youngstown, there could
be no doubt of a litigant's ability to challenge a presidential order
in the courts as long as the named defendant was a presidential
proxy, the agent selected to implement the executive command.
The absence of any discussion in the Court's opinions suggests that
the propriety of the suit against Sawyer was unquestioned. The
approval of this legal fiction to circumvent a restriction, real or
imagined, on suit against a chief executive was not original with
the Court; Blackstone had defended the king's immunity from suit
with a similar strategy of the British constitution, the right to sue
the king's "evil counsellors" and "wicked ministers" responsible
for any abuse of royal power.'12 Youngstown simply adapted this
strategy to the American context as a convenient way to reach the
merits of the steel companies' challenge to President Truman's
executive order without addressing the scope of Mississippi v.
Johnson.
Just as the Court in Johnson had expressly declined to reach
the broad issue of the President's amenability to suit, the Court in
Youngstown found a means of evading that same issue without
evading its duty of judicial review. Some commentators took the
deed for the word and concluded that the Court by ruling as it
did had in fact established the judiciary's right to enjoin the
President or at least to review presidential conduct by means of a
proxy.121 The distinction did not become a crucial one until twenty
- "For as a king cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil counsellors,
and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished. The
constitution has, therefore, provided, by means of indictments, and parliamentary impeach-
ments, that no man shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land."
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at *244.
121 For a review of responses to the decision on this point, see MAcus, supra note
101, at 220-21. Marcus concludes: "[T]he Supreme Court did not expressly reject the maxim
that the federal courts cannot enjoin the President, but in fact the Court exercised just such
a power." Id. (footnote omitted). Marcus quotes from a letter by Learned Hand to Justice
Frankfurter critical of the Court's position: "I think I should have taken the point that to
enjoin the Secretary was to enjoin the President, save that nobody seems to agree with
me." Id. at 346 n.100 (citing Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress). For a discussion
of the significance of the Court's ruling, see ScnwARTz, supra note 3, at 68-70. Schwartz
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years later, when the Watergate controversy presented the Court
with a situation in which no presidential proxy was available.
D. The President as Target: The Watergate Cases
The Watergate episode was the most dramatic confrontation
between the President and the legislative and judicial .branches of
government in American history, a confrontation that brought the
country to the brink of impeachment for the first time in over a
century. It was also the first time that legal process had been
directed to the President in connection with suspected executive
wrongdoing. In Burr, Jefferson was subpoenaed for documents
related to charges of treason against Aaron Burr, his former Vice
President and political enemy. Although Burr's counsel suggested
to the court that Jefferson was personally interested in securing
Burr's conviction, there was no claim that the President's reluc-
tance to comply with the court's subpoena was part of an illegal
conspiracy to withhold exculpatory materials. In Johnson, the
plaintiff sought to enjoin Andrew Johnson from enforcing con-
gressionally enacted statutes. The Johnson case raised no question
of the President's personal bias because Johnson himself opposed
the Reconstruction Acts and had already vetoed them' when his
Attorney General argued against the injunction. 12 Youngstown
called into question President Truman's exercise of power, but
even the Justices who voted against the President exonerated his
act from any taint of personal aggrandizement. 1'
locates the significance of Youngstown in "its rejection of the claim that acts of the
President are immune from judicial review." Id. at 69. For his interesting account of the
British origins of the proxy approach to executive accountability, see id. at 67-69; Bernard
Schwartz, Bad Presidents Make Hard Law: Richard M. Nixon in the Supreme Court, 31
RUTGEas L. Ray. 22, 23-25 (1977). For an account of "new patterns" of judicial restraint
of the President dating from Youngstown, see Dionisopoulos, supra note 3.
'2 FAJu4AN, supra note 76, at 177.
123 Justice Frankfurter observed in his opinion: "It is absurd to see a dictator in a
representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley. The
accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however, slowly, from
the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593-94 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas ended his opinion with a similar acknowledgement of Truman's
good faith: "Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage increase and
to keep the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President might use the
same power to prevent a wage increase, to curb trade-unionists, to regiment labor as
oppressively as industry thinks it has been regimented by this seizure." Id. at 633-34
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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By the time United States v. Nixon'24 came before the Supreme
Court, however, President Nixon had been named an unindicted
coconspirator by the grand jury investigating the break-in at Dem-
ocratic National Committee Headquarters and a possible White
House cover-up during the subsequent inquiry. 12 Furthermore, the
tapes of presidential conversations sought by Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski for use in his prosecutions of several White House
aides were in President Nixon's personal possession; there was no
possibility of a Youngstown approach because no presidential sub-
ordinate had the ability to secure and release the tapes at issue.
For the first time the courts were faced with a situation in which
a President openly refused to comply with compulsory process that
called for production of evidentiary materials capable of incrimi-
nating both the President himself and his closest aides. 126
The challenge for the lower courts facing the issue of presiden-
tial resistance was to craft an opinion with the limited precedents
available. The first to face the challenge was Chief Judge Sirica of
the district court for the District of Columbia. Then Special Pros-
ecutor Archibald Cox came to the court seeking compliance with
a subpoena duces tecum, issued on behalf of the Watergate grand
jury and directed to the President, or any subordinate official, for
presidential tapes and documents. 127 In a letter to the court, Pres-
ident Nixon explained his refusal to provide the subpoenaed tapes
by citing his own version of historical precedent: "I follow the
example of a long line of my predecessors as President of the
United States who have consistently adhered to the position that
t- 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
'2 After Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski filed his petition for certiorari, James St.
Clair, the President's counsel, filed a cross-petition asking the Court to review the authority
of the grand jury to name the President an unindicted coconspirator. LEON FamD". N,
UNMTED STATES V. NixON, THE PREsENT BEroRE Tm SuPRam CObRT 169, 185-87 (1974)
[hereinafter THE PaRsmENT BEFoRE THE Supta&E CouRT]. The Court granted certiorari on
the question, but in its final opinion noted that addressing the issue was unnecessary for
the resolution of the case and dismissed the cross-petition as improvidently granted. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 n.2 (1974).
"I Jaworski subpoenaed presidential tapes in connection with his prosecution of H.R.
Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff; John Ehrlichman, former Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs; John Mitchell, former Attorney General; and other White
House aides for conspiracy to obstruct justice. See United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp.
1326 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For an
identification of the legal issues raised by Jaworski's use of the subpoena, see Lee A. Albert
& Larry G. Simon, Enforcing Subpoenas Against the President: The Question of Mr.
Jaworski's Authority, 74 CoLTJm. L. Ray. 545 (1974).
,27 See In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1973).
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the President is not subject to compulsory process from the
courts."' 128
In his opinion ordering the President to submit all subpoenaed
materials for an in camera examination by the court, Sirica relied
most heavily on Marshall's opinion in Burr to correct Nixon's
reading of history. Sirica, like Marshall, began his analysis by
asserting the court's right to issue process to anyone and placing
the burden on the President to justify his exemption. 29 Quoting
extensively from Marshall, Sirica ruled that the court would deter-
mine, based on its own examination, whether in the national in-
terest any of the subpoenaed materials should not be released.
130
The opinion relied as well on Youngstown as answering the ques-
tion remaining after Johnson, whether the President could be com-
pelled by the courts to perform a ministerial act:
[TMo persist in the opinion, after 1952, that he cannot would seem
to exalt the form of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. case over
its substance. Though the Court's order there went to the Secre-
tary of Commerce, it was the direct order of President Truman
that was reversed.'
Sirica concluded this section of his opinion by again quoting at
length from Marshall, this time the passage in Burr comparing the
English king with the American President. 32 Acknowledging that
Burr did not itself resolve the issue before the court, Sirica none-
theless insisted that "[tihe conclusion reached here cannot be in-
consistent with the view of that great Chief Justice nor with the
spirit of the Constitution.'
33
Sirica's opinion represents the customary effort of a court faced
with an issue of first impression to draw on available precedent in
shaping new legal doctrine. In this case, of course, the stakes were
unusually high because the issue involved the collision of the ex-
ecutive will with the court's own authority to compel the collection
of evidence for a criminal prosecution of national significance, and
I' Id. Nixon did release memoranda of Gordon Strachan and W. Richard Howard
sought by the subpoena. See id.
119 See id. at 6-7. Sirica noted that Nixon had conceded the court's authority to issue
a subpoena and was contesting the court's authority to enforce compliance with that
subpoena. See id.'at 7.
130 See id.
13' Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
132 See id. at 10.
13 Id.
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time was short. 134 In his synthesis, Sirica departed from prior courts
in adopting a narrow reading of Johnson and relied on Youngs-
town, despite its silence on the question of the President as defen-
dant, to supplement Burr as the dominant precedent. The resulting
opinion showed more deference to John Marshall than independent
analysis but recognized clearly the American tradition of binding
the executive branch to the rule of law and made its own contri-
bution to that tradition by rejecting the President's distorted read-
ing of the history of executive prerogative.
The court of appeals, sitting en banc to hear Nixon v. Sirica,1
35
produced a more elaborate opinion approving and developing the
district court's jurisdictional ruling. 136 Agreeing with Sirica that
Youngstown endorsed jurisdiction over the President as well as
lesser executive branch officials, the per curiam opinion found
significance in Supreme Court silence: "There is not the slightest
hint in any of the Youngstown opinions that the case would have
been viewed differently if President Truman rather than Secretary
Sawyer had been the named party."' 137 Although the court expressed
a preference, based on comity, for directing legal process to exec-
utive subordinates, it rejected the notion that the President should
enjoy any exemption from judicial authority: "The practice of
judicial review would be rendered capricious-and very likely im-
potent-if jurisdiction vanished whenever the President personally
denoted an Executive action or omission as his own."' 3  The ap-
peals court thus exposed the fallacy of the legal fiction implicit in
Youngstown, the potential for a President to shield executive con-
duct from judicial review by the simple expedient of embracing a
challenged act as his own.
The recurrent theme of the appeals court opinion is its rejection
of any presidential prerogative to avoid the courts' jurisdiction.
134 The parties argued before the court on August 22. The opinion was issued a week
later, on August 29. See id. at 1, 4.
-- 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"' The case was argued before the court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
on September 11; the decision was rendered a month later, on October 12. See Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Both the President and the Special Prosecutor
challenged the district court order. The President sought a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to vacate its order; the Special Prosecutor sought a writ directing the district
court to order immediate disclosure of the tapes to the grand jury. See id. at 706. The
court of appeals found that it had jurisdiction to review the President's petition but, after
noting that review of the Special Prosecutor's petition was not essential to resolution of the
issues before it, the court dismissed his petition without decision. See id. at 707-08.
"17 Id. at 709.
'33 Id.
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Just as the opinion reads Youngstown to treat the President and
his subordinates alike, so it reads Burr to give the courts discretion
to weigh the President's "special interests" in determining whether
compliance with a subpoena should be required.3 9 The appeals
court also interpreted Johnson as rejecting the claim that the
President's dignity places him above the law."40 Further, the court
was unpersuaded by the argument that the Impeachment Clause
4'
of the Constitution and the President's election by the entire nation
warrant immunity from judicial process even in the absence of a
specific constitutional provision; the court termed these arguments
"invitations to refashion the Constitution" and rejected them. 42
For the court of appeals, as for the district court, the procedural
issue raised by the grand jury subpoena was the same as the
substantive issue raised by the President's claim of executive priv-
ilege: whether the President was beyond the reach of the law. Both
courts viewed compulsory process, like judicial review, as a mech-
anism by which they fulfilled their obligation to enforce the rule
of law. Blending the language of Burr with the silence of Youngs-
town, both courts found authority for the position that the Presi-
dent's constitutional prerogatives do not include immunity from
court process. 143
Nixon v. Sirica thus set the stage for a Supreme Court ruling
on the question of the President's amenability to process. Before
the curtain could go up, however, the chief actor left the scene.
President Nixon chose not to appeal within the five days allowed
"I See id. at 710. Like the district court, the appeals court quoted generously from
Marshall's opinion in Burr to support the court's authority to enforce as well as issue a
subpoena to the President. See id. at 709-10.
140 See id. at 712 n.53. Although the Supreme Court had not expressly rejected Attorney
General Stanbery's argument based on presidential dignity, the court of appeals "deem[ed]
it significant that the Supreme Court declined to ratify these views." Id. The court also
rejected the President's argument that the conduct at issue was discretionary rather than
ministerial, observing: "The discretionary-ministerial distinction concerns the nature of the
act or omission under review, not the official title of the defendant." Id. at 712.
"' U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cI. 6.
142 See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 711.
"4' Two members of the court of appeals dissented from portions of the court's opinion.
Judge MacKinnon found on separation of powers grounds that "recordings of presidential
deliberations cannot be the subject of a judicial subpoena if it would even remotely influence
the conduct of such deliberations or their final outcome. Enforcement of the subpoena
demonstrably would have just such an effect in this case." Id. at 752 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Wilkey insisted: "It can hardly be
questioned that in any direct confrontation between the Judiciary and the Executive, the
latter must prevail. Therefore, the 'issue' of whether the President is amenable to court
process is an illusory one." Id. at 792 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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by the court of appeals, and the decision became final.' 44 The issue
returned to court shortly thereafter, however, when Cox's succes-
sor, Jaworski, subpoenaed 64 additional tapes, and Judge Sirica
again ordered the President to deliver the tapes to the court. 145 The.
Supreme Court granted Jaworski's petition for certiorari before
judgment, 146 and once more it appeared that the Court was poised
to resolve the issue of the President's amenability to process.
Both the special prosecutor's petition for certiorari and his
brief clearly raised the amenability issue. The petition included
"[w]hether the President is amenable to the judicial process"' 147
among what it characterized as "issues worthy of review by this
Court.'" 48 The brief then developed at some length the idea that
because "[n]o one would deny that every other officer of the
executive branch is subject to judicial process, there is little basis
in logic, policy or constitutional history for concluding that a
matter becomes walled off from judicial authority simply because
the President has elected to become personally involved in it."'
49
Jaworski argued that the President shares the obligation of every
citizen to assist the government in criminal prosecutions and inter-
preted that obligation as a ministerial duty subject to judicial
authority under Johnson.'50 Predictably, the President's counsel
responded in his brief that as a consequence of the separation of
powers "compulsory process cannot issue against a President."' 5'
14 See id. at 722; TH-E PRnsiDr BEFORE THE SuREE COURT, supra note 125, at 21.
Nixon's efforts to circumvent the court's order by releasing partial transcripts rather than
the tapes themselves resulted in a confrontation with Special Prosecutor Cox and the
subsequent Saturday Night Massacre of October 20, 1973, when the President fired Cox,
and both Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckleshaus, resigned.
Id.
'd " The tapes were subpoenaed in connection with Jaworski's prosecution of several
White House aides for conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Id.
at 162. For the district court decision denying President Nixon's motion to quash the
subpoena, see Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, aff'd sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974).
" See United States v. Nixon, 417 U.S. 927 (1974).
147 THE PnsDmr BoRE Tima SUP. EmE COURT, supra note 125, at 177.
I" Id. The brief in opposition to certiorari filed by the President's counsel offered as
its sole argument the ill-advised nature of an expedited review by the Supreme Court in the
absence of a decision by the court of appeals. See id. at 179-84.
,,' 3 CoNsrrunoNA AsPEcTs OF WATERGATE: DOCUmENTs AND MAraaIAIS 211-12 (A.
Boyan ed., 1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter CoNsrrunoNA AsPEcts OF WATERGATE].
The brief relied on Burr and Nixon v. Sirica for its principal authority and referred to the
Framers' hostility toward the royal prerogative in arguing against any constitutional im-
munity from process for the President. See id. at 213-21.
See id. at 223-27.
See id. at 395.
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The brief found support in the ambiguous resolution of the Burr
subpoenas and in Johnson for the President's right to resist court
process. 52 For both sides, then, United States v. Nixon presented
procedural questions of executive immunity from judicial process
as well as substantive questions of executive privilege.
It is curious that the procedural issue surfaced only briefly in
the oral argument and never engaged the sustained interest of the
Court. James St. Clair, arguing for the President, maintained that
the existence of an impeachment inquiry in Congress prevented the
courts from adjudicating issues related to that inquiry.5 3 The Court,
obviously troubled by this challenge to judicial authority, resisted
the bait offered by St. Clair when he told the Justices that "I
don't think the President is subject to the process of the court
unless he so determines he would give evidence." 154 Even when St.
Clair made his most sweeping statements of presidential preroga-
tive, the Court remained more concerned with the impeachment
issue and the President's relation to the criminal prosecution than
with the amenability issue. Thus, when St. Clair claimed that "law
as to the President has to be applied in a constitutional way which
is different than anyone else,' ' 55 only one Justice pursued the point
by asking if a President could be sued for back taxes, 156 and the
discussion quickly returned to the role of the tapes in the upcoming
trial. When St. Clair tied his claim of presidential immunity from
criminal process to the exclusive nature of the impeachment remedy
for an incumbent President and to legislative immunity under the
112 s5e id. at 400-05. The President's brief noted with approval Jefferson's failure to
comply with either of the subpoenas issued by Marshall. In his reply brief, Jaworski rejected
this interpretation of Burr and countered with an account of the subpoena served on
President Monroe in connection with the court martial of Dr. William Barton. Although
Monroe claimed in the return of service that official duties prevented his attendance in
court, he offered to give his evidence by deposition; eventually, Monroe submitted written
answers to the court martial's interrogatories. See id. at 522. The brief interpreted this
incident as illustrating Monroe's acceptance of a subpoena as proper under Burr. See id.
"I See id. at 666-67.
04 Id. at 667. Justice Stewart responded, "Putting that to one side," and returned to
the relation of the impeachment inquiry to the criminal prosecution and the subpoena. See
id.
15 Id. at 678-79. St. Clair repeated the point a short while later: "Because while I said
the President is not above the law, the law can only be made applicable to him in a certain
way while he is in office." Id. at 683.
"' See id. at 679. The transcript does not identify the questioner. Another unattributed
response followed St. Clair's concession that the President could be sued individually: "The
Constitution speaks of persons, any person." Id. The argument then shifted back to the
role of the tapes in the criminal prosecution. See id.
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Speech and Debate Clause, the Court pursued the latter distinction
rather than the former.- 7 During his argument, Jaworski never
raised the amenability issue in any of its guises. The proceedings
before the Court ended without any participant, Justice or counsel,
invoking the Burr case as a source of illumination. 58
Thus, it is not surprising that, although the Court's unanimous
decision in United States v. Nixon 59 resolved a constitutional crisis,
it did not resolve the teasing question of the President's amenability
to process. In the structure of the Court's opinion, in its merging
of the procedural issue with the substantive issue of executive
privilege, and in the qualifications it imposed on its own ruling,
the Court was careful to avoid any sweeping or comprehensive
statement that would settle, once and for all, the scope of judicial
authority to compel the chief executive.
The organization of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
Court clearly differentiated between a trio of threshold issues and
the dramatic centerpiece of the opinion, the fourth section address-
ing the claim of an executive privilege of confidentiality exempt
from judicial review. In Section I, labeled Jurisdiction, the Court
determined that the traditionally nonfinal nature of a denial of a
motion to quash a subpoena did not deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion;160 in Section II, labeled Justiciability, the Court rejected the
President's claim that the case was an intra-executive branch dis-
According to St. Clair:
[E]ven if this is criminal the President is immune from ordinary criminal
process. He is not immune from process. But that process that is available to
the President is the process of impeachment which does not include the
function of the judiciary branch. And therefore we say that if under Gravel
the congressman is entitled to immunity even from criminal conduct for actions
taken within the legislation sphere of his conduct then it would be very hard
to support a proposition that the President as the chief executive of the country
is entitled to less.
Id. at 683. An unidentified Justice responded, "Except they didn't put it in the Constitu-
tion." Id.
-' St. Clair did invoke Johnson as authority for his argument that "the Courts will
not direct a President to exercise his discretion in any manner," id. at 682, including the
decision to release subpoenaed tapes. He cited the case once again in his surrebuttal. See
id. at 703.
M, Then Associate Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the case, see United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 718, presumably because of his prior service as Assistant Attorney
General in the Nixon administration. Rehnquist has observed: "[l]t seems ironic to me that
in the most celebrated case to have come before the Court since I became a justice, the
Nixon Tapes Case, I was not even able to listen to the argument." WiLLAm REHNQuiST,
THE SupiEmE COURT 89 (1987).
160 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 690.
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agreement in which the President retained authority to control the
special prosecutor's demands for evidence;' 6' and in Section III,
labeled Rule 17(c), the Court found the subpoena duces tecum to
be in compliance with the standards of the rule. 162 Each of the
three preliminary sections made special mention of the effect of
presidential involvement on the controlling law. Thus, in Section
I, the Court found that "the traditional contempt avenue to im-
mediate appeal is peculiarly inappropriate due to the unique setting
in which the question arises," and declined to force the President
to the "unseemly" necessity of disobeying a court order to ensure
judicial review.' 63 Again, in Section II, the Court based its ruling
that the special prosecutor had standing to bring the action in part
on "the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises'"
x6
and-in a third use of the word-'"the unique facts of this case. "165
Finally, in Section III, the Court asserted that "where a subpoena
is directed to a President of the United States, appellate review, in
deference to a coordinate branch of Government, should be par-
ticularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of Rule 17(c) have
been correctly applied."'16
The Court's handling of these preliminary issues suggests its
determination to reach the core of the case without creating any
broader precedent than necessary. Its emphasis on the "unique"
nature of the case is offered as justification for both bending the
rules in Sections I and II and applying the rule in Section III with
only a minimal accommodation to the President. There is, after
all, no suggestion that different standards for Rule 17(c) apply to
the President. Rather, there is only the requirement that the same
standards should be meticulously applied, a privilege that arguably
should be available on appeal to all subpoena challengers. Although
the authority cited for this accommodation is United States v.
Burr, 67 the Court omits from its opinion a section addressing what
161 See id. at 692.
,62 See id. at 697.
163 See id. at 691-92.
I" Id. at 697.
"' Id.
'" Id. at 702. In The Brethren, a source that must be treated with some skepticism,
the authors claim that the phrase "particularly meticulous" represents Justice Brennan's
compromise between Justice Powell's view that the President should be given special
treatment and Justice White's conflicting view that the President should be treated like any
other recipient of a subpoena under the rule. BoB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMsTRONG, THE
BRTm'~m- 320, 323-24 (1979).
167 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702.
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was for Marshall the threshold question in his case, whether a
subpoena may be issued to the President. Instead, the Court col-
lapses the questions separated by Marshall-the court's authority
to issue a subpoena and its authority to compel compliance with
it-into the single subject of Section IV, which the Court labels
The Claim of Privilege.
168
Section IV opens with a formulation of the President's claim
that the district court should have granted the motion to quash the
subpoena "because it demands 'confidential conversations between
a President and his close advisors that it would be inconsistent
with the public interest to produce." ' 169 Thus, from the outset, the
Court's focus is on the privilege of confidentiality rather than the
privilege of exemption from process. Even when the Court ad-
dresses the President's argument that separation of powers pre-
cludes a subpoena arising from a criminal prosecution, the line
between issuance and compliance is blurred. The Court starts its
discussion by rejecting either separation of powers or confidenti-
ality as a basis for "an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege
of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.' 1 70 The
discussion immediately shifts, however, to the problem of confi-
dentiality and the limits of judicial deference to the President's
need for candid conversations with his advisors. By the end of the
paragraph, the transition is complete:.
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or national
security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that
even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
communications is significantly diminished by production of such
I" Gerald Gunther notes the distinction between the two separate issues of the case,
presidential amenability to judicial process and executive privilege, and observes: "It was
possible to decide against President Nixon's claim as to the first issue and yet support his
argument as to the second.... The opinion in United States v. Nixon tended to merge and
blur those separate issues." Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy:
The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 34 (1974); see also
Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22
UCLA L. Rv. 76, 80 (1974). Kenneth L. Karst and Harold W. Horowitz agree that
"[a]lthough the opinion expresses the point only fleetingly, the Court's decision is a clear
rejection of the notion that the President is constitutionally immune from all judicial
process." Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial
Review, 22 UCLA L. REv. 47, 49 (1974). For their discussion of the immunity issue,
concluding that the issues raised by the claims of immunity and executive privilege are in
fact the same, see id. at 48-54.
"0 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 48a).
270 Id. at 706.
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material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a
district court will be obliged to provide.
7'
Of course, if the courts may compel presidential compliance with
a subpoena, then logically there should be no obstacle to the lesser
intrusion of issuing that subpoena. The distinction is not, however,
without significance even in the context of the Court's opinion. In
the case of military, diplomatic, or national security matters, would
a court be barred from issuing a subpoena or only from compelling
disclosure? Would the grounds for a motion to quash properly be
separation of powers or confidentiality? By the beginning of the
opinion's next subsection, the Court uses the term "judicial proc-
ess" to refer broadly to the legal disposition of criminal charges
rather than the service of court papers. 7 2 Although the Court
subsequently approves the issuance of the subpoena, 173 there is no
resolution of the President's boldly stated claim of complete im-
munity from compulsory process.
What the Court offers in United States v. Nixon is a balancing
test that weighs the President's need for confidentiality against the
legal system's need for relevant evidence in criminal prosecutions,
This narrow formulation limits the opinion to the context of the
case before the Court, and Burger makes explicit the Court's
intention of excluding from its language subpoenas issued in both
civil litigation and congressional inquiries:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the Presi-
dent's generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for
relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the
confidentiality interest and congressional demands for informa-
tion-, nor with the President's interest in preserving state secrets.
We address only the conflict between the President's assertion of
a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional
need for relevant evidence in criminal trials. 74
"I Id. This subsection of the opinion, FVB, concludes with another blurring of the
distinction, when the Court rejects "an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential
to enforcement of criminal statutes" because the President's "generalized claim of the
public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions" would
disturb the constitutional balance of the branches. Id. at 707. The passage fails to make
clear whether the privilege would protect against issuance or only against compliance with
the subpoena.
'1 "Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh
Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that
preserves the essential functions of each branch." Id.
"I See id. at 713.
174 Id. at 712 n.19.
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The Court strikes the balance in favor of what it terms "the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice,"' 75 a compelling definition that makes
inevitable the resolution of the case.
The Court's chief authority for its opinion is Burr, which it
cites six times. All of those citations, however, rely on Burr to
support judicial deference to the President. Thus, Burger twice
appreciatively quotes Marshall's statement that "[i]n no case of
this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president
as against an ordinary individual."'1 6 Burger also cites Burr as
endorsing "high respect to the representations made on behalf of
the President;' 177 as requiring a compelling demonstration by the
subpoena's proponent that the evidence sought is essential to the
case before the court; 7 as protecting the President from harass-
ment by unnecessary subpoenas; 79 and as providing a "high degree
of deference" to presidential records.'80 Although Marshall in Burr
was clearly concerned about the conflict of executive and judicial
authority created by the issuance of a subpoena to the President,
Burger's use of Burr mutes Marshall's central theme, the subjection
of the President, like every other citizen, to the rule of law em-
bodied in the customary forms of legal process. Even when Burger
acknowledges the limits inherent in Marshall's caution against treat-
ing the President as an "ordinary individual," he insists on a
presidential prerogative:
Marshall's statement cannot be read to mean in any sense that a
President is above the law, but relates to the singularly unique
role under Art. II of a President's communications and activities,
related to the performance of duties under that Article.'8'
The difference between Burger and Marshall is more than one
of emphasis. Where Burger treats the President's "unique role" as
a basis for unusual deference by the courts, Marshall places on the
M7 Id. at 713.
176 Id. at 708, 715. The other four citations to Burr appear at 707, 713, 714, and 715.
'" Id. at 707.
M7 Id. at 713. It is noteworthy that Burger here interpolates "criminal" to limit the
scope of Burr: "[Ilt became the further duty of the District Court... to require the Special
Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was 'essential to the justice of the
[pending criminal] case."' Id. at 713 (citation omitted).
179 Id. at 714.
11 Id. at 715.
,I Id.
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President a heavy burden of establishing a basis in his official
duties for any exemption from the ordinary compulsions of the
law. Where Burger elevates presidential prerogative, Marshall re-
strains it. United States v. Nixon suggests that the Court has
followed the result of Burr but has presented its message in a more
deferential light than Marshall would have employed.
If United States v. Nixon failed to resolve the difficult question
of the President's relation to the judicial process, it is only fair to
take into account the extraordinary circumstances under which it
was written and the extraordinary effect it achieved. After receiving
lengthy briefs prepared on an expedited briefing schedule, the
Court heard argument on July 8, 1974.112 Although the Court had
completed the work of its regular term and was able to concentrate
exclusively on the case, it was acutely aware of the ongoing im-
peachment inquiry in the House of Representatives, the national
mood of crisis, and the suggestions by President Nixon, reinforced
by the evasive language of his counsel at oral argument, that the
President might refuse to obey a Supreme Court decision ordering
release of the tapes.1 13 Under these circumstances, it is understand-
able that the Justices would try, as they had at other times of
national distress, to produce a unanimous opinion, one that would
"I See id. at 690. Because certiorari had been granted prior to judgment by the court
of appeals, the only decision before the Court was that of Judge Sirica for the district
court.
"I3 In the most quoted exchange of the argument, St. Clair parried Justice Marshall's
efforts to extract a concession that President Nixon would be bound by the Court's
resolution:
Justice Marshall. You are submitting the matter to this Court-
Mr. St. Clair. To this Court under a special showing on behalf of the
President-
Justice Marshall. And you are still leaving it up to this Court to decide
it.
Mr. St. Clair. Yes, in a sense.
Justice Marshall. In what sense?
Mr. St. Clair. In the sense that this court has the obligation to determine
the law. The President also has an obligation to carry out his constitutional
duties. ...
Justice Marshall. Well, do you agree that that is what is before this
Court, and you are submitting it to this Court for decision?
Mr. St. Clair. This is being submitted to this court for its guidance and
judgment with respect to the law. The President, on the other hand, has his
obligations under the Constitution.
Justice Marshall. Are you submitting it to this Court for this Court's
decision?
Mr. St. Clair. As to what the law is, yes.
CONsTrrnoNAL. ASPECTS OF WATERGATE, supra note 149, at 671.
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speak with the full institutional authority of the Court.'84 The
compromises necessary to achieve unanimity on such a difficult
issue may well account for the doctrinal lapses of the opinion, for
its uneasy blend of general deference to executive prerogative with
a specific demand for immediate compliance, and for its choice of
the narrowest available grounds for resolution.1
5
Though its jurisprudence was flawed, the opinion proved to be
swift and potent in resolving the Watergate crisis. United States v.
Nixon was issued on July 24, sixteen days after oral argument. On
July 31 and August 1 the House Judiciary Committee voted articles
of impeachment; on August 5, President Nixon released the tapes
listed in the subpoena; and, four days later, on August 9, he
became the first President of the United States to resign from
office. 86 Like Youngstown, a case cited twice by the Court,18
United States v. Nixon was an institutional victory for the Court
and the country. 8 Neither case expressly proclaimed the Court's
constitutional authority to hold the President accountable by means
of judicial process for the conduct of his office, yet both achieved
precisely that practical result. President Truman released the steel
mills, President Nixon released the tapes, and in each case a
constitutional crisis was averted.
The Court, however, is more than a political institution, and
its performance must be measured by gauges more sensitive than
practical results. United States v. Nixon left unresolved the question
that had troubled the courts since Burr, the question of the Pres-
ident's amenability to the judicial process. It offered the lower
I" See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
"I For two analyses of the implications of unanimity for the opinion, see William Van
Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L.
REv. 116, 120-23 (1974); Mishkin, supra note 168, at 86-90. For an account of the Court's
internal disagreements and compromises, again to be read with some skepticism, see WoOa-
WARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 166, at 308-46.
I' Philip B. Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin? 22 UCLA L.
REv. 68, 69 (1974). Kurland believes that the Court's decision was "a political decision not
a judicial one" and is strongly critical of the Court's reasoning. See id. at 70-75.
17 Youngstown is cited as authority for the Court's ability to rule conduct by the
executive or legislative branches unconstitutional. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S at
703. Burger also cites Justice Jackson's concurring opinion for the proposition that the
Constitution "enjoins upon [the government's] branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." Id. at 707.
I For the argument that the Watergate situation should have been left to Congress
in the exercise of its impeachment power rather than to the Court, see Gunther, supra note
168.
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courts, in which numerous cases were soon to be filed against
President Nixon's successors, only a loosely crafted precedent,
uninformed by a clear vision of the presidency and the courts.
E. The Presidential Pocket: Nixon v. Fitzgeraldi 9
In the wake of United States v. Nixon, Richard Nixon departed
from the White House but not from the courts. Eight years later,
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,190 the Supreme Court returned to the ques-
tion of the President's amenability to the judicial process. If the
earlier case had concealed the Justices' differences behind its broad
language and loose argument, the later case made clear the pow-
erful disagreement that existed among the six members of the Court
who participated in both decisions. 191 The Court in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald divided five-four, and instead of a single opinion there were
four perspectives, two in dissent, on the relation of the President
to the courts. 192
Unlike the previous cases challenging presidential conduct, Fitz-
gerald was an action for civil damages arising from the plaintiff's
removal from his position as a management analyst for the De-
partment of the Air Force. Fitzgerald, who had testified before
Congress concerning cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane,
claimed that the subsequent elimination of his position as part of
a departmental reorganization by the Nixon administration was in
fact a reprisal for his testimony in violation of two federal statutes
and his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 93 After
the district court rejected Nixon's claim of absolute immunity and
the court of appeals dismissed his collateral appeal, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of presidential immu-
nity. 194
-- 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
19 Id.
19 The six were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Powell.
"9 Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. The Chief Justice wrote a concurring opinion. Justice
White wrote a lengthy dissent joined by all the dissenters; Justice Blackmun's separate
dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731, 733.(1982).
193 See id. at 730-40.
I" See id. at 740-41. The court of appeals based its dismissal on the "collateral order"
doctrine, which precludes review of an interlocutory order unless it presents an unresolved
question of law. Because the court of appeals had earlier denied the claim of absolute
[VOL. 80
PRsIDsENTIAr ACCOUNTABILITY
The Court resolved that issue squarely in favor of the former
President by affording him absolute immunity from civil damages
for presidential conduct. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
drew heavily on two themes from United States v. Nixon: the
unique nature of the President's office and judicial deference to
presidential prerogative. Thus, the opinion identifies immunity as
"a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office,
rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers
and supported by our history." 195 The word "unique" appears
four times in less than three pages, 19 each time distinguishing the
demands of the President's office from those of other executive
officials granted only qualified immunity by earlier decisions of
the Court.'9
Powell also turned to United States v. Nixon for a balancing
test based on separation of powers doctrine to determine under
which circumstances a court may exercise jurisdiction over the
President. The test balances "the constitutional weight of the in-
terest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority
and functions of the Executive Branch."' 98 Applying the test to
what the Court terms "this merely private suit for damages," it
strikes the balance in favor of presidential immunity. 199 When the
Court moves beyond the particular facts of the case to establish
general guidelines, it extends absolute immunity to all acts within
the "outer perimeter" of the President's official duties. 200
Fitzgerald makes explicit what remained implicit in United States
v. Nixon, an interpretation of constitutional history that finds
deference to presidential prerogatives in the drafting of the Con-
stitution and in the prior decisions of the Court. Although Powell
concedes that his historical evidence, relegated to a footnote, is
presidential immunity in Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in
part by an equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), it reasoned that no such question
existed. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, noting that at the time of dismissal it
had not yet addressed the question of presidential immunity. The Court also invoked "the
special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prero-
gatives under the separation of powers." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 742-43.
I- Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749.
1' See id. at 749-51.
,17 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 479 (1978) ("In a suit for damages
arising from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are
entitled only to the qualified immunity ... subject to those exceptional situations where it
is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business.").
'"Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.
'"See id.
m See id. at 765.
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fragmentary, he derives from the silence of the convention debates
confirmation for his view that the Framers intended to provide
presidential immunity from civil litigation.2°  To strengthen his
arguments Powell also cites Johnson, unmentioned by the Court
in United States v. Nixon, as part of a tradition of deference to
presidential conduct. 2°2 For the majority, history and policy con-
verge to dictate the same result, a deference to the President that
is essential to the effective performance of his executive duties.
The difference between United States v. Nixon and Fitzgerald
is not simply that the balancing tests produced opposite outcomes
or that Richard Nixon lost the first decision and won the second."'
Rather, in Fitzgerald, for the first time a majority of the Court
articulated an expansive view of presidential prerogative, a view
that looked to nonlegal remedies to control the excesses of unau-
thorized executive conduct. 2° Although the Court confidently as-
serts that "absolute immunity will not place the President 'above
the law,' 20 its opinion in fact goes well beyond any prior case
law to confer on the President an unqualified exemption from the
ordinary legal process for remedying the wrongs done by one
person to another. 2°6 In constructing a tradition of deference, the
Court at the same time casts a new light on its earlier decision
compelling presidential compliance with a subpoena, a decision
that in retrospect seems itself to be an exception to that newly
crafted tradition.
The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger seeks to anchor
the Court's opinion more firmly in the constitutional authority of
2' "But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be
subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens." Id. at 751 n.31.
Powell also relies on Justice Story's Commentaries and on President Jefferson's resistance
to the Burr subpoena. See id.
211 See id. at 753 n.34. The note also cites Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838), as support for that tradition.
20, For a comparison of the two cases attributing the different results to changes in
public opinion toward Richard Nixon, see Anne Y. Shields, Note, The Supreme Court
Under Pressure: A Comparative Analysis of United States v. Nixon and Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
57 ST. Jon's L. Rnv. 750 (1983).
21 The opinion lists such alternate remedies as impeachment, congressional oversight,
a vigilant press, the desire for re-election, and a concern for historical reputation. See
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 757.
2D Id. at 758.
Stephen L. Carter has argued that the Court reached the correct result in Fitzgerald
because the constitutional system of checks and balances provides the appropriate political
remedies for an "evil President." See Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial
Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1341, 1398-
99 (1983).
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separation of powers doctrine and in the historical authority of
tradition. Burger asserts, without demonstration, that presidential
immunity "has been taken for granted for nearly two centuries,"70
and he is at great pains to distinguish both Burr and his own
opinion in United States v. Nixon as criminal subpoena cases
irrelevant to the issue of civil immunity from damages. 20 8 In his
view, his earlier opinion stands for restraint by the judiciary on
questions of presidential decision making "absent imperative con-
stitutional necessity" 2° for intervention by the courts.
Burger offers two concessions to the principle of presidential
accountability under the law. He emphasizes the limitation of the
Court's decision to civil damage actions, 210 and he acknowledges
that litigants may question whether a presidential action falls within
the scope of official duties.21' He is, however, willing to go even
further than the majority by asserting that Congress may not
affirmatively establish presidential liability by statute,212 an issue
expressly reserved by the Court's opinion. As the author of United
States v. Nixon, Burger removes that opinion and its chief author-
ity, Burr, from the central line of authority that he identifies as
supporting the constitutional necessity for presidential immunity
from judicial control except in the most compelling circumstances.
In his elaborate dissent, Justice White, like the other three
dissenters a member of the unanimous Court of United States v.
Nixon, offers a dramatically different context for resolving the
problem of presidential immunity. For White, the grant of absolute
immunity to the presidential office rather than to a function of
that office is a return to the discredited tradition of royal prero-
gatives:
Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather
than to particular activities that the President might perform,
places the President above the law. It is a reversion to the old
notion that the King can do no wrong. ... Now, however, the
Court clothes the Office of the President with sovereign immu-
nity, placing it beyond the law.213
21 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 758 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 760.
2 Id. at 761.
210 See id. at 759.
211 See id. at 761 n.4.
212 See id. at 763-64 n.7.
213 Id. at 766-67 (White, J., dissenting).
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In opposition to the majority view, White presents an alterna-
tive history that emphasizes the importance of both presidential
accountability and the courts' ability to provide a remedy for
individual harms as fundamental to the American legal system.
White notes in passing the irony of releasing on the tenth anniver-
sary of the Watergate episode a Court decision that calls into
question the President's subjection to the rule of law.2 14 For him,
Fitzgerald is the anomaly, a decision that departs from precedent,
from history, and from constitutional design.
White identifies two distinct lines of precedent that compel
presidential accountability. The first, including Youngstown, estab-
lishes the authority of the courts to enjoin presidential conduct. 21 5
The second, beginning with Burr and reinforced by United States
v. Nixon, establishes the authority of the courts to serve the Pres-
ident with judicial process. 21 6 White argues that the majority's
constitutional argument cannot be reconciled with these precedents,
that there is no constitutional principle that affords the President
immunity from civil damages while exposing him to injunctive
remedies and criminal process.21 7 In White's view, any separation
of powers problem originates not from the specially protected
nature of the President's office but from impermissible judicial
interference with a particular presidential duty; the proper judicial
approach must be the same one applied by the Court to questions
of immunity for other government officials, that is, a functional
analysis of the claimed intrusion to determine whether the President
is prevented by the threat of civil litigation from properly perform-
ing the duties of his office.218 Nothing in the constitutional history
offered by the majority persuades White that the Framers intended
to provide absolute immunity for the President, and his opinion is
at some pains to refute the evidence on which the Court relies.
21 9
The second part of the dissent's analysis looks to the plaintiff's
interest in securing relief. White selects an imposing antecedent for
this interest, Chief Justice Marshall's language in Marbury v. Ma-
dison: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
214 See id. at 767 n.2.
211 Id. at 780. White also cites Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
216 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 781-82 (White, J., dissenting).
217 See id. at 780.
218 Id. at 784, 790-91 ("In this case, therefore, the Court should examine the functions
implicated by the causes of action at issue here and the effect of potential liability on the
performance of those functions.").
219 See id. at 771-79.
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right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.'"m' The plaintiff's interest is further
advanced by the Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents,221 which created a federal cause of action for
constitutional violations by government officials. From these pre-
cedents the dissent concludes that the wrongdoer, whether President
or lesser official, should be spared the costs of the wrong only
when immunity is necessary to the operation of government. 2 It
is here that White's two arguments intersect in the doctrine of
functional immunity, which rejects an absolute privilege for the
President at the expense of his victim.
For the dissent, then, there is no support in either constitutional
history or case law for "a special jurisprudence of the Presi-
dency."'m In White's view, United States v. Nixon stands not for
deference to the President but for the presumption that, except in
compelling situations, the President's official acts are subject to
the rule of law.
In his brief dissent, Justice Blackmun endorses White's view
that the Court's decision is itself an aberration from a basic tenet
of American law:
For me, the Court leaves unanswered [Justice White's] unan-
swerable argument that no man, not even the President of the
United States, is absolutely and fully above the law.... Until
today, I had thought this principle was the foundation of our
national jurisprudence. It now appears that it is not.-
4
The fundamental differences between the majority and dissent in
Fitzgerald suggest the limited range of common ground supporting
the unanimity of United States v. Nixon. In perspective as well as
result, the two cases offer irreconcilable visions of the President's
place within the judicial system.
II. LIGATIoN AND THE PRESIDENT: THE LowER COURTS
RESPOND
As Nixon v. Fitzgerald demonstrates, lower courts faced with
litigation against the President could draw two opposite messages
220 Id. at 783, 789 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
22 403 U.S. 388 (1971), cited in Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 783, 789 (White, J., dissenting).
See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 783, 784 (White, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 793.
Id. at 797-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The second point made
in Blackmun's dissent is that the settlement reached by the parties before oral argument
rendered the case inappropriate for review. See id. at 798-99.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW Jou[NAL
from the authority of United States v. Nixon. The result of the
case, both jurisprudentially and politically, was the assertion of
judicial control over presidential conduct; the language of the case,
however, suggested the special nature of the presidency and the
deference it merited. Further, because the Court had declined to
rule on the relation of civil litigation to the President, courts could
either extend by analogy or distinguish the holding expressly limited
to subpoenas issued in the context of a criminal prosecution.
In the years before the Nixon presidency, the lower courts had
few occasions to worry about their treatment of the President. As
both Justices Powell and White noted in Fitzgerald, until the Court
created a federal cause of action against government officials for
constitutional violations through Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents,m lawsuits against the President were almost
nonexistent. 26 The few exceptions-a suit against President Eisen-
hower for reduction of the national debt and immediate desegre-
gation,22 a suit against President Johnson for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the Vietnam Warn8-were quickly dismissed
by the lower courts and denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.
In the early years of the first Nixon administration, however, even
before Bivens and the resolution of the Watergate litigation, a
number of suits were filed against the President for injunctive and
-2 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
21 "Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with this Court's 1971 Bivens deci-
sion, fewer than a handful of damages actions ever were filed against the President. None
appears to have proceeded to judgment on the merits." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
752 n.31 (1982). Justice White qualified the majority's vision of a post-Bivens litigation
explosion: "Even granting that a Bivens cause of action did not become available until
1971, in the 11 years since then there have been only a handful of suits. Many of these are
frivolous and dealt with in a routine manner by the courts and the Justice Department."
Id. at 795-96 (White, J., dissenting).
2P See Easter v. Eisenhower, 351 U.S. 908 (1956) (denying certiorari). For a brief
account of the case, see SCHUBERT, supra note 3, at 342 n.24.
2 Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968) (dismissing suit for lack of
standing, presence of a nonjusticiable political question, and lack of consent by United
States to suit), affd on other grounds sub nom. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). The Secretaries of State and Defense were also
named as defendants; the President was not served with process. For a suit against President
Johnson seeking compensation for damage done by the American military abroad, see
Eminente v. Johnson, 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dismissing for lack of consent by
United States to suit), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966). See also Pietsch v. President of
the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970) (dismissing taxpayer suit alleging unconsti-
tutional use of revenue from tax surcharge to finance Vietnam war). For another suit by
the same plaintiff in connection with a later war, see Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1278, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 316 (1991).
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declaratory relief 229 These suits were generally ambitious in scope,
challenging administration policies concerning the war in Southeast
Asia,"'0 seeking compliance with federal statutes, 231 or demanding
the allotment of funds appropriated by Congress.232 They reflected
an increased confidence, following years of successful civil rights
litigation, in the legal process as an appropriate corrective to na-
tional problems. The suits also reflected the tendency of the Nixon
administration, by its disregard for congressional prerogatives, to
establish what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has termed an "imperial
presidency. '23
In resolving these early cases without the guidance of United
States v. Nixon, the lower courts relied on a variety of approaches
and reached a surprising variety of results. Some courts were
certain that separation of powers doctrine precluded them from
exercising any jurisdiction over the President and therefore dis-
missed the complaints before them. 2 4 Others relied on the distinc-
For an early damage action against President Nixon, see Reese v. Nixon, 347 F.
Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (seeking damages for violation of civil rights from federal,
state, and local government officials). In 1959, one district court set forth in dictum the
accepted position without offering any authority: "[T]he courts may not enjoin or restrain
the President, or compel him by means of a mandatory injunction or a writ of mandamus,
to perform some act. It is recognized that he may not be required to respond to a subpoena."
Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D.D.C. 1959). The case, a journalist's action
seeking an injunction to permit inspection of government documents, did not name the
President.
2 See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972) (seeking to enjoin the
President from ordering military personnel to conduct operations in Cambodia in the absence
of a declaration of war); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973) (seeking
declaratory judgment that aerial combat operations in Cambodia were illegal); Meyers v.
Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (seeking to enjoin expenditure of funds for war
in Southeast Asia); Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (seeking to enjoin
expenditure of funds for war in Southeast Asia); Suskin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71 (N.D.
Ill. 1969) (seeking declaration that draft laws were unconstitutionally discriminatory in favor
of women and clergy).
"I See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (seeking writ of mandamus to compel the President to make pay adjustments under
statute); Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1973) (seeking
to compel the President to appoint members of National Advisory Council on Indian
Education under statute); National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees v. Nixon, 349 F.
Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1972) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel pay adjustments
under statute).
2 See San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (seeking writ of mandamus to compel the President to allot appropriated funds to
executive agencies).
" SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at vii.
z" See National As'n of Internal Revenue Employees, 349 F. Supp. at 21; Reese, 347
F. Supp. at 316-17. Both cases cite Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1868).
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tion in Mississippi v. Johnson between discretionary and ministerial
conduct 235 on the avoidance of confrontation between branches of
government,23 or on the political question doctrine237 to support
their dismissals. Several courts, however, anticipated the Supreme
Court by rejecting the absolute position that they lacked jurisdic-
tion over the President in all circumstances. Early in 1972, in a
suit alleging the unconstitutionality of the war in Southeast Asia,
Judge Lord, citing United States v. Burr,2 flatly "reject[ed] the
notion that defendant Nixon is completely immune from judicial
process because he is the President of the United States," 39 al-
though he went on to dismiss the suit against Nixon on the ground
that relief was available from the remaining defendant, the Secre-
tary of DefenseYm Another district court, citing Judge Lord's
decision, declined to dismiss a suit seeking to compel appointments
entrusted to the President by the Indian Education Act on the
ground that the language of the statute made the substitution of
another defendant impossibleY 1
The most elaborate of these early decisions, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Nixon2 2 considered the complaint of federal
employees seeking to compel the President to implement a pay
adjustment pursuant to the Federal Pay Comparability Act.2 3 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
2 See Suskin, 304 F. Supp. at 72.
"6 See San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 329 F. Supp. at 672. The court finds it
"clear, therefore, that a long standing policy, if not a positive rule, has avoided such an
intragovernmental confrontation. The plaintiffs have failed to show this Court any good
cause why this long standing forbearance should now be abrogated." Id. The court granted
the motion to quash service to the President.
231 See Meyers, 339 F. Supp. at 1391 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 98
(1968)). The court also found the absence of a justiciable controversy and lack of standing.
See id. Although the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of presidential immunity
from suit, it indicated its agreement with the court in Atlee, 336 F. Supp. 790.
2' 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
23 Atlee, 336 F. Supp. at 791.
uO See id. at 792. The court relied on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). Its dismissal of the suit against the President was, however, explicitly
without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to reinstate their claim in the event that the conduct
at issue was alleged to be "entirely unilateral." Atlee, 336 F. Supp. at 792. When the suit
was refiled and heard by a three judge court, a majority dismissed it as a nonjusticiable
political question; Judge Lord dissented from the dismissal. See Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.
Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
2A1 See Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 358 F. Supp. at 975-76. The case against the
President was subsequently dismissed as moot. See id. at 973.
242 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
241 See id. at 591-92. The plaintiff union sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
a writ of mandamus.
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"no immunity established under any case known to this Court bars
every suit against the President for injunctive, declaratory or man-
damus relief. '"2 After opening its opinion with a long quotation
from Marbury v. Madison on the scope of judicial review of
executive conduct24, the court carefully distinguished Mississippi
v. Johnson on the ground that the case before it, unlike Johnson,
raised a clear instance of ministerial conduct appropriately within
the court's sphere of action.24 National Treasury Employees Un-
ion, decided between the same court's own opinion in Nixon v.
Sirica27 and the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Nixon,24 reveals the shift in judicial attitude toward presidential
conduct from deference to skepticism, from reluctance to act to
reluctance to refrain from acting:
Thus, in the circumstances of this case, this Court should be
extremely reluctant in light of the fundamental constitutional
reasons for subjecting Executive actions to the purview of judicial
scrutiny to hold that the federal judiciary lacks power to compel
the President to perform a ministerial duty in accordance with
the law. 9
Although the court declined to issue a writ of mandamus, choosing
instead to grant only declaratory relief, its decision made clear its
conviction that federal courts possessed both the jurisdiction and
the authority to compel ministerial acts by the President.20
In the wake of United States v. Nixon, some plaintiffs were
encouraged to file extravagant claims against the President. It is
Id. at 609.
2A1 See id. at 589-91.
See id. at 606-07, 613-14.
27 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
- 418 U.S. 683 (1974). National Treasury Employees Union was decided on January
25, 19.74, Nixon v. Sirica on October 12, 1973, and United States v. Nixon on July 24,
1974.
u," National Treasury Employees Union, 492 F.2d at 612.
LI See id. at 616. The court found it "more appropriate" to resolve the case under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. See id. For an earlier case in which Judge Sirica
found that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant, inter alia, a writ of
mandamus to compel President Nixon to respond to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
Senate committee, see Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 57 (D.D.C. 1973). At a later stage of the proceedings, though
several months before United States v. Nixon, the court ruled the matter justiciable but
denied relief on the basis of the Committee's inadequate showing of entitlement in light of
likely prejudicial pretrial publicity. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 524 (D.D.C. 1974).
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worth noting that the courts handling these cases generally contin-
ued to dismiss them without relying on or even invoking the
malleable authority of the new Supreme Court precedent. Thus,
when the Committee to Establish the Gold Standard sued President
Ford to enjoin the sale of gold by the Treasury, the district court
dismissed the case against the President sua sponte on the ground
that the injunction sought would "affect the performance of the
non-ministerial duties of his office."2' In an even more ambitious
suit brought by a pro se plaintiff to nullify the 1972 presidential
election and compel a new election, the Second Circuit based its
dismissal on defective service of process. 2
Of greater moment were two suits seeking damages from for-
mer President Nixon for allegedly illegal surveillance activities. In
Halperin v. Kissinger, 3 decided two years before Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald settled the issue, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that neither separation of powers doctrine
nor prudential concerns entitled the President to absolute immunity
from suit.254 The court cited three precedents for the exercise of
judicial authority over presidential conduct- Youngstown, Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union, and United States v. Nixon-
but the more recent Supreme Court case came last, and all three
case names appeared only in footnotes. 25 The court's ringing con-
clusion sounded the theme of presidential subjection to the rule of
law:
Finally, we think the application of qualified immunity to defen-
dant Nixon is mandated by our tradition of equal justice under
law. The President is the elected chief executive of our govern-
ment, not an omniscient leader cloaked in mystical powers.2 6
"' Committee to Establish the Gold Standard v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 504, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
22 See Griffith v. Nixon, 518 F.2d 1195, 1196 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Sloan v. Nixon,
60 F.R.D. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 958
(1974). In Sloan, the district court dismissed on standing grounds a pro se action to enjoin
the President and Vice President from remaining in office and to annul the appointments
of the Chief Justice of the United States and three Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
The judge was sufficiently provoked to observe: "The complaint is utterly without legal
foundation, and, while over a lifetime I have seen many misguided lawsuits, this must be
the nadir." Id. at 229. The judge also, however, acknowledged that "[a]lthough such
actions represent an uneconomic waste of judicial time, it is important for our country that
every citizen know that a day in court is his even where the highest officers of the nation
are the subjects of his complaint." Id. at 230.
-1 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
-4 See id. at 1211-13.
21 See id. at 1211 & nn.133-135.
2% Id. at 1213.
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It is striking that the authority cited by the court for this view is
its own decision in Nixon v. Sirica, 2 7 not the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Nixon. A few months later a district
court relied on Halperin in denying Nixon's motion to dismiss a
similar claim for damages; the .court found that Nixon had failed
to show "any reason why the elevated rank of his office distin-
guishes his case from that of other high level federal officials,'"'25
a point on which it apparently found United States v. Nixon of
no precedential value. For the lower courts, then, the Supreme
Court's unanimous decision did not provide the jurisprudential
foundation on which to build their own structures accommodating
presidential prerogatives and the demands of the judicial process. 2 9
In the administrations that followed Nixon, lawsuits naming
the President as defendant became increasingly common. Many of
these suits used litigation as a means of challenging broadly based
executive policies or actions; others sought reversal of narrower
and more personal executive decisions. Some of these suits were
brought by members of Congress, others by citizens outside the
government establishment; some were resolved on the merits, others
dismissed under a variety of legal theories. In virtually all of these
cases, however, the issue of the amenability of the President to
suit was neither raised by the defendants nor discussed by the
court. Without any express direction from the Supreme Court, the
lower courts accepted as established the right of any plaintiff,
government official or private citizen, to sue the President for
injunctive or declaratory relief. Of course, after 1981 Nixon v.
Fitzgerald precluded any claims for damages against the President.
But all areas of presidential conduct, including those expressly
excluded from the reach of United States v. Nixon, became open
to challenge in the courts.
In the immediate aftermath of Watergate, President Ford was
relatively sheltered from the onslaught of litigation that followed
See id. at 1213 n.147.
Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (paraphrasing
Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1210).
29 One district court, faced with an executive privilege defense by former President
Nixon to a subpoena duces tecum for White House tapes and transcripts of conversations
concerning demonstrations on May Day of 1971, cited United States v. Nixon and noted in
dictum that "the rationale underlying the refusal of the Supreme Court to find an absolute
executive privilege in criminal cases applies with very considerable force to the present civil
case." Dellums v. Powell, 70 F.R.D. 648, 649-50 (D.D.C. 1976). The court went on to
deny Nixon's motion to quash the subpoena by distinguishing between the strength of
executive privilege claims by incumbent and former Presidents. See id. at 650.
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his time in office. Of the handful of cases filed against him, most
were resolved in his favor. Two cases challenging decisions made
by his administration-the first, the awarding of military grants to
Israel under the Emergency Security Assistance Act;26° the second,
a denial of the plaintiff's request for military records26 1 -were both
dismissed, neither on the issue of presidential amenability to suit.
262
The most interesting challenge came in Murphy v. Ford,263 a suit
by an attorney seeking a declaration that Ford's pardon of Nixon
was unconstitutional. 264 The district court entertained the suit and
ruled on the merits, finding the pardon a legitimate exercise of
executive power "to end the divisions caused by Watergate and to
shift the focus of attention from the immediate problem of Mr.
Nixon to the hard social and economic problems which were of
more lasting significance." 265 Only in Committee to Establish the
Gold Standard v. United States did a court dismiss an action
against Ford on the ground that as President he was not amenable
to an injunctive action seeking to compel performance of a non-
ministerial duty.266 From this point on, courts looked to the nature
of the claim rather than the office of the defendant in determining
whether dismissal was appropriate.
During President Carter's single term of office, over thirty suits
were filed naming him as defendant. Although a number of these
suits were dismissed, none of the courts relied on the special nature
of the presidency to support dismissal. Instead, courts dismissed
on a variety of grounds including failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted, 267 lack of standing,268 presentation of a
nonjusticiable political question,269 and filing in an incorrect court. 20
21 See Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (dismissing suit as a nonjusticiable
political question concerning the conduct of foreign affairs).
2" See Rivera v. Ford, 440 F. Supp. 732 (D.P.R. 1977) (dismissing suit for failure to
allege exhaustion of administrative remedies).
' For a case awarding summary judgment to the plaintiffs in a class action Civil
Rights Act suit claiming sex discrimination in appointments to the Board of Veterans
Appeals, see Krenzer v. Ford, 429 F. Supp. 499 (D.D.C. 1977). Although President Ford
was one of the named defendants, the district court dismissed the complaint against him
without explanation. See id. at 503.
21 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
See Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
20 Id. at 1374.
2' See Committee to Establish the Gold Standard, 392 F. Supp. at 506.
20 See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
20 See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981).
See Freiberg v. Muskie, 651 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981) (seeking to compel intervention
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More often, however, suits were resolved on the merits. Such suits
included a challenge to the procedure by which a serviceman's
status was changed from missing in action to killed in action,271 a
shipowner liability case, 272 and cases seeking injunctions against the
President. 27 The courts addressed the substantive issues, deciding
at times for the President and at times against him.
One interesting consequence of the courts' willingness to enter-
tain actions against the President appeared in the Carter adminis-
tration, when members of Congress filed suit challenging presidential
conduct undertaken without congressional participation. Four leg-
islative suits were filed against President Carter: a suit by sixty
members of the House of Representatives seeking a declaratory
judgment that President Carter lacked authority to return the Pan-
ama Canal Zone to Panama without congressional approval; 274 a
suit by members of Congress for injunctive and declaratory relief
to prevent the President from terminating a defense treaty with
Nationalist China in the absence of congressional approval;275 a
suit by Senator McClure challenging the legality of former Con-
gressman Abner J. Mikva's appointment to the United States Court
of Appeals by the President on the ground that federal judicial
salaries had been increased by the Congress of which Mikva was
by the Department of State on behalf of the plaintiff with the government of West
Germany).
- See Barclay Indus. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1980) (involving suit alleging
improper revocation of duty-free treatment of Brazilian hardwood within exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court).
21 See Townsend v. Carter, 476 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (granting the defen-
dants' summary judgment motion on the ground that the status hearing had afforded the
plaintiff due process). For a case with similar facts and result, see Darr v. Carter, 640 F.2d
163 (8th Cir. 1981) (granting the defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground that
the administrative process was not yet complete and the plaintiff had not demonstrated
irreparable injury). The Secretaries of Defense and of the Air Force were also named as
defendants in both cases.
212 See Lusson v. Carter, 599 F. Supp. 8 (D.P.R. 1983) (determining that defendant
shipowner was immune from suit under federal statute). The court did not discuss the
President's role as a named defendant.
2,1 See, e.g., Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying preliminary
injunction compelling government to warn members of military of potential side effects of
exposure to radiation from nuclear test on grounds that plaintiffs failed to show likelihood
of success on the merits or to establish irreparable harm); Hopper v. Carter, 572 F.2d 87
(2d Cir. 1978) (denying preliminary injunction to prevent serviceman's change in status from
missing in action to dead on grounds that plaintiff failed to show likelihood of success on
the merits or to establish irreparable harm).
' See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"' See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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a member;276 and a suit by Senator Dole to enjoin the President
from returning property to the Hungarian government without the
consent of the Senate.27 7 Three of these cases were dismissed-one
as a nonjusticiable political question,2 78 one for failure to state a
claim, 279 and one for lack of standing-but one was resolved on
the merits by the District of Columbia Circuit, which ruled that
the President possessed the power to terminate the treaty indepen-
dently. 281 All of these cases accept the use by the legislative branch
of the judicial branch to question the legitimacy of conduct by the
executive branch. In such decisions the idea of a complete sepa-
ration of the branches of government, endorsed in Mississippi v.
Johnson, is replaced with a more flexible approach. Although the
courts were not eager to hear these challenges to presidential action
and dismissed them when possible, none of the courts rejected as
improper the institutional role imposed upon them by the legislator-
plaintiffs.
Several other cases filed against President Carter make clear as
well that courts were willing to consider issuing injunctions directed
to the President rather than a subordinate designated to implement
presidential orders. In one case, the district court found the Pres-
26 See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981).
2, See Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).
"I See id. at 1110-11. The court rejected Senator Dole's claim that the agreement
between the President and the government of Hungary was a bilateral treaty concluded
without Senate approval, finding instead that the President's conduct of foreign relations
raised a nonjusticiable issue and denying the request for a preliminary injunction. See id.
- See Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1056.
2w See McClure, 513 F. Supp. at 271.
n' See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 708-09. The Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari and issued an order vacating the judgment below and remanding the case with
directions to dismiss. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). There was no opinion
for the Court, but there were four separate opinions representing the views of eight members
of the Court; only Justice Marshall concurred in the result without opinion. Writing for
himself and concurring in the judgment, Justice Powell thought that the case should be
dismissed as unripe because Congress had not yet acted, and "[t]he Judicial Branch should
not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until
the political branches reach a constitutional impasse." Id. at 997. Also concurring in the
judgment and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens, Justice
Rehnquist thought that dismissal should be based on the political question doctrine "because
it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations
and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of
the President." Id. at 1002. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented in part
because he thought the case should have been given plenary consideration. See id. at 1006.
Dissenting alone, Justice Brennan would have affirmed on the merits the decision of the
court of appeals based on the President's power to terminate recognition of foreign gov-
ernments. See id.
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ident's actions-raising the retail price of gasoline-to be beyond
the bounds of his statutory authority and therefore unlawful .2 2 In
another injunction action, the First Circuit vacated an injunction
issued by the district court to prevent the government from relo-
cating Cuban and Haitian refugees without securing an environ-
mental impact statement. 283 The court of appeals did not question
its ability to enjoin the President; instead, it relied on congressional
intent under the relevant statute to afford the President discretion
in making such determinations. 2" Although only the Independent
Gasoline Marketer's Council v. Duncan285 court quoted Youngs-
town as authority for its scrutiny of presidential conduct, 26 both
cases demonstrate the ease with which, following Watergate, the
lower courts adapted Youngstown's treatment of a cabinet officer
to the President. For courts asked to issue injunctions against
President Carter, the question was no longer whether a President
could be enjoined but instead whether the plaintiff could meet the
generally accepted standards for the remedy sought.
By the time of the Reagan presidency, a court of appeals could
refer to the current "era of widespread resort to the judiciary to
compel executive action." 287 Members of Congress continued to
bring suit to challenge executive action, and increasingly, private
litigants used the courts as a forum for their opposition to presi-
dential policies. There were also, however, a substantial number
of suits brought by individuals or entities claiming immediate and
282 See Independent Gasoline Marketer's Council v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 620-
21 (D.D.C. 1980) (consolidated with Marathon Oil Corporation v. Carter). For a case
granting a preliminary injunction compelling review of census records to correct an alleged
undercount of New York residents, see Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980).
President Carter was a named defendant. For a Second Circuit decision finding importers'
challenge to trade agreements reached under the Trade Act of 1974 to be justiciable, see
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977); see also No Oilport! v. Carter,
520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (granting defendants partial summary judgment but
retaining for trial issue of whether oil pipeline violated Indian treaty rights); Alaska v.
Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978) (denying preliminary injunction on ground that
President's conduct was not an abuse of statutory discretion).
n, See Colon v. Carter, 633 F.2d 964 (lst Cir. 1980), rev'g 507 F. Supp. 1026 (D.P.R.
1980).
2" See id. at 967. For a case refusing to enjoin the President on the ground that his
termination of the plaintiff's active duty status fell within the range of his statutory
discretion, see Cinciarelli v. Carter, 662 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
231 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
2" See id. at 619-20; see also Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 782
(relying on Youngstown for authority to determine whether President followed specific
statutory procedures).
2" Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 1988).
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direct harm caused by presidential acts, sometimes in conjunction
with the acts of other executive officials and sometimes in isolation.
Several suits from this period seem to be frivolous in nature;2
8
many others represent serious challenges to the legality of executive
conduct and received the serious attention of the courts.
The suits brought by members of Congress cover some of the
most controversial policies of the Reagan administration: the Amer-
ican presence in El Salvador and the provision of military aid to
that country;2 9 the use of American ships as escort vessels in the
Persian Gulf without a formal declaration of war;290 the support
provided to the Nicaraguan Contras;291 the invasion of Grenada;
292
and the administration's conduct of intelligence activities. 293 All
these cases were dismissed: one based on the political question
doctrine,29 one based on mootness, 295 one based on ripeness, 29 one
based on standing, 297 and two based both on the political question
doctrine and on a doctrine developed specifically by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in response to con-
2u See, e.g., Komasinski v. I.R.S., 588 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (dismissing suit
for failure to state a cause of action and for bad faith in using a complaint to express
political views). In Komasinski, the taxpayer plaintiff sought $300,000,000 in compensatory
damages for seizure of his 1972 Ford van to pay a tax penalty and $200,000,000 in punitive
damages. Although President Reagan was a named defendant, he was not served with
process. See id. at 988 n.5; see also Miller v. United States, No. 89 C0737 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
8, 1989) (dismissing pro se complaint against 70 defendants, including President Reagan, as
frivolous); Ledbetter v. Richmond, No. 86-1394 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1986) (dismissing pro
se complaint against President Reagan, the Department of the Treasury, Congress, and the
Speaker of the House as unintelligible).
2" See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
" See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs
included members of Congress, citizens and residents of Nicaragua, and residents of Florida.
See Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot,
765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2 See Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1985); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Both cases were brought by private as well as congressional plaintiffs.
2 See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210. A second cause of action by the congres-
sional plaintiffs based on violation of the Boland Amendment was dismissed as moot. See
id. All claims by private plaintiffs were also dismissed.
2 See Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1129.
See Greenham, 755 F.2d at 37.
2" See United Presbyterian Church, 738 F.2d at 1382. The district court had dismissed
the action brought by Representative Dellums on equitable discretion grounds; then Judge
Scalia, writing for the court and questioning the wisdom of the doctrine, affirmed the court
below "on the ground that the reasons it gave for declining to exercise remedial discretion
demonstrate a lack of standing." Id. The claims of the private plaintiffs were dismissed for
lack of standing. See id. at 1381.
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gressional litigation.298 Under the equitable or remedial discretion
doctrine, 29 courts exercise "judicial restraint where a congressional
plaintiff's dispute is primarily with his or her fellow legislators." 30
In Lowry v. Reagan,3 0 1 the district court noted that members of
Congress themselves disagreed about the applicability of the War
Powers Resolution to the President's actions in the Persian Gulf
and declined to "impose a consensus on Congress" by resolving
an internal dispute.3 02 The court specified, however, that its refusal
to hear the claim was not based on any reluctance to adjudicate
differences between the executive and legislative branches: "A true
confrontation between the Executive and a unified Congress, as
evidenced by its passage of legislation to enforce the Resolution,
would pose a question ripe for judicial review. ' 30 3 Thus, by the
1980s, the issue for the courts facing these congressional challenges
had become not intrusion on presidential prerogatives but rather
intrusion on the internal decisionmaking of the legislative branch.
Suits brought by private litigants against President Reagan may
be loosely divided into two categories: those questioning broad
administration policies and those seeking relief for specific personal
harm. Suits in the first category challenged the deployment of
missiles, 04 funding for the Contras, 30 5 the resumption of diplomatic
relations with the Vatican, 306 and the designation of 1983 as the
2" See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356-57; Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337-40. For an analysis
of the problem of congressional suits by Judge McGowan of the District of Columbia
Circuit, see Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. Rnv.
241 (1981); see also Tapia et al., supra note 3.
- The doctrine originated in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). The court in Lowry, citing Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983),
explained that the term "remedial discretion" is used when the plaintiff seeks both declar-
atory and injunctive relief, "equitable discretion" when the plaintiff seeks only equitable
relief. See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 n.27.
- Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357.
30! 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
- See id. at 338-39.
- Id. at 339.
-04 See Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (ruling justiciable a challenge
by the State of Colorado and environmental groups to the adequacy of the Air Force's
environmental impact statement); Greenham, 755 F.2d 34 (involving a suit by private and
congressional plaintiffs challenging deployment of Cruise missiles).
- See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (dismissing action for injunctive and declaratory relief against continued
funding of Contras).
" See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194
(3d Cir.) (involving suit by 103 organizations and individuals claiming violations of Article
II, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914
(1986).
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Year of the Bible. 3° Although most of the suits were dismissed,
the courts did show an increasing tendency to take seriously the
merits of these quasi-political enterprises and an uneasiness with
prior bases for quick disposition. Thus, even though the District
of Columbia Circuit, reviewing a challenge to Contra funding in
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Re-
agan,308 ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under
either international law or the Fifth Amendment,309 it reversed the
district court's blanket application of the political question doctrine
to all of the plaintiffs' claims. 310 In Romer v. Carlucci,31' the Eighth
Circuit also reversed a district court ruling that challenges to de-
ployment of MX missiles based on the adequacy of the Air Force's
environmental impact statement constituted a political question; it
ordered the court below "to review these claims with all the rigor
and scrutiny required by law" under the Department of Defense
Authorization Act.312 Even the district court declining to enjoin the
President from designating 1983 as the Year of the Bible agreed
that the plaintiff had standing to seek an injunction and based its
decision on the uncertainty of the President's future conduct.313
The suits by plaintiffs seeking relief for more specific harm
demonstrate even more clearly the courts' acceptance of the Pres-
ident as an appropriate defendant for a wide range of executive
branch conduct. In some of these suits the conduct at issue was
markedly presidential: an executive order transferring to an arbi-
tration tribunal pending suits against Iran as part of the hostage
release agreement,3 14 or the removal of an incumbent from the
District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission.315 The courts
See Zwerling v. Reagan, 576 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (claiming Establishment
Clause violation); Gaylor v. Reagan, 553 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (denying motion
for preliminary injunction to prevent designation of Year of the Bible).
859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See id. at 933-35.
110 See id. at 933.
31 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988).
312 See id. at 447. The court ruled that additional claims by the plaintiffs were not
covered by the statute and were therefore beyond the power of the court to review. See id.
3 See Gaylor, 553 F. Supp. at 361.
14 See Chas. T. Main Int'l v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Mass. 1981)
(dismissing action for declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus). For
another challenge to an executive order, see American Federation of Government Employees
v. Reagan, 870 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenging exclusion of certain members of
Marshals Service from terms of Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act).
3I See Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250 (D.D.C. 1981).
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decided in favor of the President in the first case316 and against
him in the second, 317 but both results were based on analysis of
the limits of presidential power under the relevant statutes and the
Constitution; neither opinion questioned the propriety of requesting
injunctive relief against the President. In other suits, the President
was linked as a defendant with executive officials or agencies
having more direct responsibility for the challenged activities: the
Secretary of State for his refusal to issue visas to aliens invited to
speak on public matters, 3 1  or the Department of Commerce for
the methodology of the census. 319 The courts hearing these and
similar cases seemed untroubled by the inclusion of the President,
who frequently went unmentioned in the text of their opinions,
and proceeded to analyze the issues in terms of the rights and
authority of the non-presidential defendants. 320 Although courts
continued to dismiss some cases on familiar grounds like standing
and political question doctrine,321 they now frequently relied on
detailed statutory analysis in. determining that suits should not go
316 See Main, 509 F. Supp. at 1166 (finding presidential authority under Article II and
International Emergency Economic Powers Act).
3,1 See Borders, 518 F. Supp. at 268 (finding no removal authority under the District
of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act and no violation of
separation of powers in restriction of the President's right of removal).
311 See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
119 See City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 713 F. Supp. 48
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment); see
also Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing complaint seeking
statistical adjustment of 1980 census).
3" See Abourezk, 785 F.2d 1043 (finding subject matter jurisdiction and remanding
for review in light of statutory analysis); City of New York, 713 F. Supp. 48 (finding that
plaintiffs had standing and the court had authority to review the government's methodol-
ogy). For other cases naming both the President and other members of the executive branch
as defendants, see, for example, Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.) (including as
defendants Secretaries of Defense and State and Director of United States Defense Intelli-
gence Agency), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988); Jones v. Reagan, 748 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1984) (including as defendants Secretary of Health and Human Services, Surgeon General,
and Acting Director of Bureau of Medical Services), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985);
Arakawa v. Reagan, 666 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1987) (including as defendants the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Personnel Management, Merit Systems Protection Board,
and Federal Circuit).
32! See, e.g., Arjay Assocs. v. Reagan, 707 F. Supp. 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade) (noting
lack of standing to challenge Omnibus Trade Bill as bill of attainder), aff'd, 891 F.2d 894
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (holding suit by families of missing
Vietnam veterans to compel the President to investigate under Hostage Act nonjusticiable
based on the President's conduct of foreign affairs).
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forward.3 2 Most striking, courts without fanfare now ordered relief
for plaintiffs against the President and other government defen-
dants. Thus, a district court awarded summary judgment to plain-
tiffs claiming that the Department of Energy had failed to publish
notices required by its own regulations; the court specifically noted
that the President was also required to foliow procedures estab-
lished by law. 323 Even when presidential activities were at issue, a
district court granted a preliminary injunction to news organiza-
tions seeking to block implementation of a policy announced by
the President and his press secretary excluding television media
from "limited coverage" White House events. 32 Throughout the
opinion the court spoke diplomatically of the "White House De-
fendants," but the result was unmistakable: the President was
enjoined from carrying out a policy governing press coverage of
his own official activities.3 2S
The Reagan presidency was also the occasion for the return to
the courts of a variant of the issue in United States v. Burr and
United States v. Nixon, the amenability of the President to a
subpoena issued in connection with a criminal prosecution. The
issue had surfaced earlier, during President Ford's administration,
when a district court upheld a subpoena of the President as a
defense witness in Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme's trial for at-
tempted presidential assassination.3 26 Although the court acknowl-
edged that the subpoena of an incumbent President as a witness
in a criminal trial was without precedent, it cited Burr, Sirica, and
322 See Gary Steel Supply Co. v. Reagan, 711 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dismissing
suit for reimbursement for costs of environmental cleanup because amendments to CERCLA
relied on by plaintiff became effective after cleanup order was issued); Briggs & Stratton
Corp. v. Baldrige, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (granting summary judgment to
defendants on ground that challenged Commerce Department regulations were authorized
by Export Administration Act), aff'd, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984).
3 See Texaco v. Department of Energy, 604 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99 (D. Del. 1985)
(citing Metzenbaum v. Edwards, 510 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 795 F.2d
1021 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1030 (1986)). Reagan was the named
defendant in a consolidated case, Pennzoil Co. v. Reagan.
32A See Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Companies, 518 F. Supp. 1238
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
;I See id. at 1246.
"6 United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975). A year earlier, the
district court granted Richard Nixon's motion to quash a subpoena for a deposition on the
ground of the risk to Nixon's health. See United States v. Mitchell, 385 F. Supp. 1190,
1191-92 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd sub nom United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 85-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977). Both courts relied as well on the
limited value of Nixon's testimony to the defendants.
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United States v. Nixon for the proposition that "where the Presi-
dent himself is a percipient witness to an alleged criminal act, the
President must be amenable to subpoena as any other person would
be. ' 327 Because the President could furnish testimony relevant to
the defendant's criminal intent, the court agreed to issue the sub-
poena. Recognizing, however, the burden that the subpoena would
impose on the President, the court authorized the taking of his
testimony by means of a videotaped deposition, 32 an unprecedented
response to an unprecedented situation.
The Ford subpoena had successors more notable than itself. In
the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, two national security
officials in the Reagan White House, John Poindexter and Oliver
North, were prosecuted for criminal conduct arising from their
positions within the administration; both subpoenaed former Pres-
ident Reagan to testify at their trials. One district court dealt
handily with the North subpoena, first asserting the court's "power
to enforce its compulsory process" but then finding that the de-
fendant had failed to demonstrate that the Reagan testimony was
"essential to assure the defendant a fair trial. 3 29 The second court,
in a series of decisions, explored in greater detail the complexities
of subpoenas to a former President for documents and testimony
concerning matters with potential national security implications.
The district court hearing motions in Poindexter's case took a
straightforward course in resolving a Reagan motion to quash a
subpoena duces tecum that called for numerous entries from a
presidential diary. 30 After reviewing the entries requested in cam-
era, the court ordered those it deemed relevant to be turned over
by the former President to the defendant. 3 ' The court anticipated
a claim of executive privilege and explained that it would respond
by following the procedures outlined in United States v. Nixon,
but it never questioned the propriety of the subpoena or the former
President's willingness to submit the requested entries to judicial
examination.332 After the anticipated claim was made, the court
3 Fromme, 405 F. Supp. at 582.
See id. at 583.
"' United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.D.C. 1989), 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
- See United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1990). The only authority
cited by the court was United States v. Nixon, for the limited purpose of authorizing in
camera review of subpoenaed documents. See id. at 138.
"I See id. at 141.
332 See id.
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made a significant concession to the former President. Noting that
"the protection of the prerogatives of the Presidency presents such
a special and countervailing circumstance," the court ruled that
counsel for Reagan was entitled to review the defendant's ex parte
filings supporting his discovery plan and revealing his defense
strategy.33  Both opinions, however, avoided any discussion of the
larger issues surrounding presidential subpoenas.
The court found Poindexter's subpoena ad testificandum a
good deal more problematical than his subpoena duces tecum.
Although the court regarded as "settled that a President, whether
former or incumbent, may be subpoenaed to be a witness in judicial
proceedings in an appropriate case, ' 334 it was left with the task of
formulating the standard by which to evaluate such subpoenas.
Troubled by the ambiguity of the history of presidential immunity,
the court nonetheless selected a rule it considered "sympathetic ' 335
to the President even in the absence of a claim of executive privi-
lege:
[H]e will only be compelled to testify at the trial of this case if
the Court is satisfied that his testimony would be material as
tested by a meticulous standard, as well as being necessary in the
sense of being a more logical and persuasive source of evidence
than alternatives that might be suggested. 336
311 See United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D.D.C. 1990). The court
believed that access to the defendant's filings would "assist in enabling the President to
make his presentation to the Court regarding the balance to be struck between the defen-
dant's need for the Presidential documents and the legitimate prerogatives of the Presi-
dency." Id.
3M United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 146 (D.D.C. 1990). After reviewing
the history of presidential testimony, the court found the issue settled by United States v.
Nixon but noted that courts in the past had attempted "to exercise this power in a way
that would be least damaging to the Presidency or onerous to the particular individual
occupying the Office, to the extent that this was possible and consistent with the rights of
the litigant who was in need of such testimony." Id.
311 Id. at 147.
316 Id. In a footnote, the court cited with approval Judge Gesell's standard in United
States v. North. See supra text accompanying note 329. It also cited its own earlier decision
rejecting the "defendant's demand for the appearance of President George Bush" and noted
that the defendant had not renewed the demand. See Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. at 144-45
n.l (citing United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 30-31 (D.D.C. 1989)). In the
earlier decision, the court noted that the former Vice President's evidence might be cumu-
lative and also relied on "the deference due the incumbent President." Poindexter, 725 F.
Supp. at 30. The court commented further that "respect for the Chief Executive and head
of a branch of government co-equal to the Judiciary dictates that the production of evidence
from a sitting President not be coerced, by subpoena or otherwise, unless such evidence is
necessary to the defense and just resolution of the cause." Id. n.26.
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After examining the questions that the defendant planned to
ask at trial and determining that most met its rigorous standard,
337
the court faced the final difficulty, the proper means of taking
presidential testimony. Here the court weighed the conflicting claims
of the defendant and the former President and rejected the means
preferred by each side, in-court testimony sought by the defendant
and written interrogatories sought by Reagan. Like the United
States v. Fromme 338 court, Judge Greene ruled that the former
President should give a videotaped deposition, a procedure that
would offer the defendant the spontaneity of live testimony while
providing safeguards for the disclosure of sensitive national security
matters and the invocation of executive privilege.33 9 As a further
accommodation to the unusual circumstances, the court announced
that it would be present at the deposition to make immediate
rulings on disputed issues.3 40 The court thus struck a balance be-
tween two fundamental principles: the view that excusing Reagan
from testifying "would be inconceivable-in a Republic that sub-
scribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings
nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not
accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their
courts of law," and the view that "the Court has the obligation
to protect the rights of the former President and the privileges of
the Presidency from the risk of unnecessary disclosures of confi-
dential deliberations or national security subjects."4'1 Judge Greene's
painstaking response to the Reagan subpoena suggests how many
uncertainties remained in the wake of United States v. Nixon and
how little guidance the district courts found in that opinion for the
delicate task of applying its generalities to the new situation of
presidential testimony at trial.
In less than a term, the Bush presidency has attracted a sub-
stantial number of suits naming the President as a defendant.
Several of these suits have been dismissed as frivolous.3 42 These
33 See Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. at 153.
3" 405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
331 See Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. at 158.
See id. at 159.
34 Id. at 160. In two subsequent opinions, the court ruled that the news media were
not entitled to attend the videotaping of the deposition, see United States v. Poindexter,
732 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1990), and that, although able to view the videotape, the news
media were not entitled to receive copies of it prior to trial, see United States v. Poindexter,
732 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1990).
342 In cases filed in forma pauperis, the federal court may dismiss the case "if satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
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dismissals were generally of pro se civil rights complaints which
the courts found had failed to offer any facts linking the President
to the sometimes bizarre events or harm alleged. 341 Other cases
reflected the passage of new statutes and the efforts of plaintiffs
to claim their benefits. Thus, after the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 was
amended to provide compensation for environmental cleanups,
several companies that had performed such cleanups under orders
from the Environmental Protection Agency sued the President and
other executive branch defendants for reimbursement; these suits
were dismissed by courts declining to apply the statute retroac-
tively.3
In suits raising substantial claims based on performance of
constitutional or statutory duties by the executive branch, a few
courts showed a surprising reluctance to approach the merits. When
four members of the House of Representatives sued to invalidate
an agreement between the Executive Branch and the congressional
leadership that funds appropriated for the Nicaraguan Contras
would not be expended without consultation, the district court
shied away from the claim that the agreement represented an
unconstitutional distortion of the lawmaking process.3 45 Reading
prior case law from the District of Columbia Circuit to discourage
all suits by legislators,31 the court avoided the complexities of prior
343 See, e.g., Zatko v. Baker, No. 91-451, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2819 (D.D.C. Mar.
11, 1991) (claiming incarceration in violation of diplomatic status); Gudknect v. Bush, No.
90-7935, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 380 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1991) (seeking collection of alleged
damage award against the President and freedom for others from death sentence); Carvajal
v. United States, No. 89-8277, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,741 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1989)
(claiming discriminatory treatment by court and correctional systems); Dollar v. Bush, No.
89-4996, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8574 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1989) (claiming, inter alia,
membership of President and Vice President in Mexican Mafia and their participation in
the assassination of President Kennedy). For a damage action dismissed on immunity
grounds, see Schloegel v. United States, No. C-89-3913, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,657
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1990) (claiming compulsion by government to serve in intelligence
activities for twelve years without pay).
3" See Chicago Steel & Pickling Corp. v. Bush, No. 88 C 5941, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14560 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1989); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 736 F. Supp. 945 (N.D.
Ind. 1989); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249 (D.D.C. 1989).
34 See Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989). Under the Bipartisan
Accord, funds would not be released "except in the context of consultation among the
Executive, the Senate Majority and Minority leaders, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Minority leader, and the relevant authorization and appropriation com-
mittees." Id. at 1551 (quoting H.R. RP. No. 23, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 4).
34 See id. at 1552-54. The court offered no citations in support of its interpretation
and failed to distinguish prior cases by members of Congress in which the federal courts
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decisions and relied instead on an imprecise blending of two the-
ories to support dismissal:
If standing is now the ground of decision of choice in such cases,
the Court finds that the plaintiffs have no standing here. They
have a collegial remedy: they can persuade a majority of their
fellows to change the law or abandon the "side agreement."
Alternatively, because the subject matter of both the Bipartisan
Accord and the Act involves issues of national defense and for-
eign policy, the Court finds it to have been committed to the
political branches by the Constitution. 47
In a challenge to the accuracy of the 1990 census, a district
court in Illinois followed a tortuous path before dismissing the
class action filed by the "chronically undercounted" to secure
proper political representation and allocation of federal funds.
34
After first declining to certify the class,349 the court acknowledged
its divergence from New York courts350 that found the issue
justiciable"I and lamented its inability to refer the case to the Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation.352 Consoling itself with the argument
that those undercounted by the census were not "without any
political remedy whatsoever, ' 353 the court found their claim to be
a nonjusticiable policy question.
354
In both of these cases the courts' discomfort with their task is
apparent. Both seem to recognize the seriousness of the issues
showed a willingness under some circumstances to reach the merits. See supra notes 274-
81, 289-303 and accompanying text. It concluded: "It is less important that district courts
correctly identify the more academically respectable reason for declining to decide such
disputes than that they do decline them." Burton, 723 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
34 Id. at 1554.
3" See Tucker v. United States Department of Commerce, 135 F.R.D. 175 (N.D. Ill.
1991). The "chronically undercounted" were "racial and ethnic minorities including African-
Americans and Hispanics; documented and undocumented aliens; homeless people; people
who do not read or speak English well; and people living in poverty or in high-crime areas
in both urban and rural communities." Id. at 476.
349 See id. at 178.
110 "The adjudication of this case presents the very real and substantial risk of incon-
sistent judgments. The Census Bureau could very likely be required to do one thing in New
York and quite another in Illinois." Id. at 179.
311 See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
35 See Tucker, 135 F.R.D. at 179.
31 Id. at 180.
354 See id. at 182. Among other factors cited by the court were the delegation of the
census to Congress (which it acknowledged did not "necessarily" take the case from its
jurisdiction); the lack of manageable standards; the alternate courses of action available to
the plaintiffs; and the risk of inconsistent judgments (another district court had already
approved the plan). See id. at 181-82.
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before them and the fact that other courts have dealt more sym-
pathetically with similar cases, yet both seem determined to dispose
of these matters as nonjusticiable. In straining for a rationale to
support dismissal, neither court looks to the role of the President
as a defendant; in fact, neither mentions the President's partici-
pation. Even for federal courts unhappy with public and private
challenges to executive conduct, the distinction between the chief
executive and his subordinate officials has for purposes of justicia-
bility disappeared."'
Other courts showed a readiness to reach, the merits of claims
against the President as a routine part of their business. In a New
York census case brought by representatives of urban areas and
minorities, the district court, unlike its Illinois counterpart, found
the plaintiffs' claims to fall outside the political question doctrine
and to be ripe for resolution; 3 6 it granted the plaintiffs a declara-
tory judgment that a statistical adjustment of the 1990 census
would not violate the Constitution.357 When the Fifth Circuit was
faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of an executive order
for drug testing of federal employees, it too ruled on the merits,
finding the order facially constitutional.35 8 All of these cases link
the President with other executive offices, and none of the courts
spares even a mention of the distinction between the defendants.
The ease with which the courts resolve these cases is in striking
contrast to the convoluted logic of courts seeking to avoid cases
testing the limits of executive conduct. The presence of the Presi-
"I For other suits dismissed as nonjusticiable, see Arjay Associates, Inc. v. Bush, 891
F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit by manufacturer's representatives challenging
statutory exclusion of importation of manufacturer's products for lack of standing); Inter-
national Labor Rights Education and Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C.
1990) (dismissing claim of failure to enforce worker rights provisions of Generalized System
of Preferences of the Trade Act of 1974 for failure to state a claim and lack of adequate
criteria for review). The court in International Labor recognized the plaintiffs' "genuine
programmatic concerns" and specifically disclaimed any intention of limiting their pursuit
of other remedies from the Customs Court or the United States Trade Representative. See
id. at 499. For a case substituting President Bush for President Reagan before dismissing
claims against the President on the ground that complete relief would in theory be available
from other executive officials, see Huddle v. Reagan, No. 88-3130, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7070 (D.D.C. May 24, 1991) (involving suit alleging conspiracy to deprive anti-nuclear
demonstrators of their constitutional and statutory rights).
"' See City of New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761, 764-
68 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
3 See id. at 767.
31' National Treasury Employees Union v. Bush, 891 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1989). The
court directed that any specific challenges to drug testing be "brought against the individual
plans implementing the Order." Id. at 102.
PREsiDENTiAL AccouNTAB.ITY
dent among the defendants in no way disturbs what has'now
become the norm, the willingness of courts to hear such cases
unless they fall within an increasingly limited category of claims
deemed nonjusticiable for reasons that stem from the identity of
the issues or the plaintiffs rather than the defendants.
The most dramatic and revealing cases filed against President
Bush not surprisingly arose from the most dramatic event of his
tenure, the Persian Gulf War. Since the Nixon years the idea of a
suit against the President has become an accepted form of princi-
pled protest against executive policy, and the President's decision
to send military forces to the Persian Gulf without a formal dec-
laration of war from Congress prompted legal challenges by public
and private litigants. The responses of the courts to these challenges
suggest the variety of approaches and attitudes still prevalent within
the federal judiciary when the President is named as a defendant
in a suit raising sensitive constitutional issues.
Shortly after President Bush announced his decision increasing
military deployment to the Persian Gulf in order to provide a force
capable of offensive action, fifty-four members of Congress filed
suit to enjoin him from launching an attack against Iraq without
congressional authorization.5 9 The court carefully evaluated the
defenses raised by the Department of Justice on behalf of the
President before concluding that relief was not appropriate. In
rejecting the defense of the political question doctrine, it charac-
terized as "far too sweeping" the President's claim that only the
executive branch may determine whether a military operation con-
stitutes war' 6° and ruled "that courts do not lack the power and
the ability to make the factual and legal determination of whether
this nation's military actions constitute war for purposes of the
War Clause.3 s61 The court also rejected the argument that it was
precluded from hearing any case that involved the nation's foreign
affairs; whether a case raised a political question was rather to be
"' See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). The President's announce-
ment came on November 8, 1990, and the suit was filed on Nov. 19. See id. at 1143-44.
Only one of the 54 plaintiffs was a member of the Senate. A group of law professors and
the American Civil Liberties Union filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs.
1w See id. at 1145.
' Id. at 1146. The court did qualify its position somewhat: "That is not to say that,
assuming that the issue is factually close or ambiguous or fraught with intricate technical
military and diplomatic baggage, the courts would not defer to the political branches to
determine whether or not particular hostilities might qualify as a 'war."' Id. at 1145. On
the record before it, the court found that offensive action by the current level of military
forces would constitute war. See id.
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determined by scrutiny of the particular issue before the court.362
On the standing question, the court found without difficulty that
"members of Congress plainly have an interest in protecting their
right to vote on matters entrusted to their respective chambers by
the Constitution. ' 363 And in reviewing the District of Columbia
Circuit's doctrine of remedial discretion, the court found that
because no remedy was available to members of Congress "by
persuasion of their colleagues alone" the doctrine was inapplica-
ble. 364 The court concluded that "in principle, an injunction may
issue at the request of Members of Congress to prevent the conduct
of a war which is about to be carried on without congressional
authorization. '365 What fell between principle and practice in this
case was the doctrine of ripeness. Following Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,36 the court imposed the
additional requirement that in a suit claiming a violation of the
legislative power to declare war the plaintiffs must represent a
majority of Congress; 367 in the absence of a majority, the issue was
not ripe for resolution. The court also suggested without deciding
that the uncertain course of the President's future actions might
render the suit unripe.368 Although the court's decision was a defeat
for the plaintiffs, its language offered a promising foundation for
future litigation. The court's avowed willingness under appropriate
circumstances to enjoin the President at the request of a unified
Congress suggested its acceptance of a legal action by one branch
against another as a valid means of restraining a President from
exceeding the bounds of his constitutional authority.
In another case decided the same day by another judge of the
same circuit, the district court showed itself to be considerably less
hospitable toward suits against the President. 369 The plaintiff, a
sergeant in the National Guard assigned to military duty in the
Persian Gulf, claimed that such deployment exceeded the Presi-
dent's authority under the War Powers Clause of the Constitution
m Id. at 1146.
30 Id. at 1147.
3& See id. at 1149.
365 Id.
444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
3 See Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1150-51.
3 See id. at 1152.
30 See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990). Both decisions were released
on December 13, 1990. Dellums was heard by Judge Harold H. Greene, Ange by Judge
Royce C. Lamberth.
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and the War Powers Resolution and asked for an injunction or-
dering his return. 370 Unlike the court rendering the previous deci-
sion, the court here identified three distinct bases for its dismissal
of this challenge: the political question, equitable discretion, and
ripeness doctrines. The court first disclaimed either the authority
or the ability to resolve issues concermng the foreign relations and
war powers assigned by the Constitution to the two political
branches of government. 37' Rejecting what it termed "[m]eddling
by the judicial branch in deternuning the allocation of constitu-
tional powers," the court relied on two aspects of separation of
powers-the political question doctrine and equitable discretion-
to support its refusal to decide whether the President's deployment
of troops to the Persian Gulf constituted a war.372 Where the first
court had indicated its willingness to provide Congress with a
forum for claims of presidential overreaching, this court directed
Congress to the nonjudicial remedies of its own appropriations and
impeachment powers. 373 On the ripeness issue, the court found that
the President's future conduct in the Persian Gulf was simply too
speculative to warrant judicial review 374 Only on the question of
standing was the court receptive to the plaintiff's complaint. In a
single footnote, the court conceded that the plaintiff had standing
to bring his suit because the War Powers Resolution permitted a
private cause of action. 375 Like the court hearing the congressional
complaint, 376 this court could have based its demal of injunctive
relief solely on the grounds of ripeness. Its decision to rely as well
on separation of powers argnments indicates its discomfort with
the use of the courts to settle disputes between the legislative and
executive branches. Thus, two courts of the same circuit reached
the same result but by the structure of their opimons expressed
divergent views on the scope of judicial authority and capacity to
resolve claims against the President.
370 See id. at 510. The plaintiff also claimed a Fifth Amendment due process violation
in the procedures used by the Army to determine his medical fitness for deployment.
Summary judgment was awarded to the defendants on that claim. See id. at 517-18.
" See id. at 513.
172 See id. at 514.
3 See id.
3 See id. at 515.
3,, See id. at 511 n.I. The court employed the test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975), a test whose authority has been placed in serious doubt by recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804 (1986).
376 See Dellams, 752 F Supp. 1141; supra notes 359-68 and accompanying text.
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Both of the cases discussed above involved direct participants
in the Persian Gulf drama. When private citizens challenged the
war on the same constitutional theory, the courts were unanimous
in dismissing their suits on the ground that they lacked injury in
fact sufficient to support standing. 3 7 Even here, however, the
courts expressed differing attitudes toward the suits before them.
One court noted disapprovingly that the plaintiff "seeks to employ
the federal courts as a platform for his political views, ' 378 while
another acknowledged the plaintiff's "altruistic purposes in bring-
ing this lawsuit" and his "deep concern for the loss of life in any
future military action. ' 379 The tension between the legal and polit-
ical aspects of these suits is evident in the courts' divergent per-
spectives on the use of litigation as a means of criticizing presidential
policy.3
80
One final case exhibits clearly the dilemma for courts reluctant
either to distort justiciability doctrine or to review unnecessarily
presidential conduct arising from military operations. In this case,
members of the press challenged the regulations governing media
coverage of the Persian Gulf War.38' The court found that the
plaintiffs had standing to bring their suit382 and that judicial review
3m See Wallace v. Bush, No. C-91-0264-VRW, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1068 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 1991); Miller v. Bush, No. 90 C 6803, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,638 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 3, 1990); Pietsch, 755 F. Supp. 62. In addition to her constitutional claim, Miller
sought $25,000,000 in damages; the court dismissed the damage claim as frivolous. For
other examples of cases that challenged the war and were dismissed on standing grounds,
see Farsaci v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 22 (D. Me. 1991); Daly v. Bush, No. CV 4-91-15 (D.
Minn. 1991).
378 Wallace, No. C-91-0264-VRW, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1068, at *2.
Pietsch, 755 F. Supp. at 67. The court also recognized that the plaintiff had filed
a similar challenge to the Vietnam War. See id.
3 For a Persian Gulf War case in which the President was not named as a defendant
but his authority was directly at issue, see Sherman v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 385
(M.D. Ga. 1991). In Sherman, a member of the Air Force sought by writ of habeas corpus
to question the President's power to extend his term of enlistment. The district court
resolved the case by finding statutory authority for the President's action but expressed its
concern about a potential conflict between legal and practical consequences. Noting that
the law did not support the plaintiff's claim, the court reflected that a decision for the
plaintiff "would trigger lawsuits and claims by other military personnel similarly situated
and bring chaos to orderly military planning." Id. at 388. The court insisted that "[i]f the
law were clear that Petitioner is entitled to be discharged, then this court would order him
discharged," but its relief at not being faced with such a dilemma was palpable. See id.
311 See Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
The other named defendants were President Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Peter Williams, and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. An amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs was filed by
thirteen members of Congress.
11 See id. at 1556.
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of regulations limiting press access to combat areas did not intrude
on military operations and thus did not fall within the political
question doctrine.38 a On the mootness issue, the court ruled that
because the regulations had been lifted but not eliminated, the
plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief were moot but their claims
for declaratory relief were not.3 4 Although the court found no
obstacles in any of these doctrines to review on the merits, it
nonetheless decided in the exercise of its discretion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' First and Fifth Amendment claims of limited access to
military operations. The court was troubled by the fact that these
were issues of first impression385 and that "long-settled policy"
required courts to "refrain from deciding issues presented in a
highly abstract form, especially in instances where the Supreme
Court has not articulated guiding standards. ' 8 6 In the absence of
"a well focused controversy," the court found that prudence com-
pelled dismissal.31 Thus, the court dealt forthrightly with the stan-
dards of justiciability and found no doctrinal barrier to review. Its
reluctance to proceed reflected instead an institutional caution in
the face of difficult constitutional issues, a caution based in part
on the fact that resolution of the case would require an evaluation
of executive actions in time of war. The court spoke of the lack
of Supreme Court guidelines on the First Amendment issues, but
its decision also reflected the uncertainty of other federal courts
asked to adjudicate the constitutional limits of presidential conduct.
CONCLUSION
In the years following Mississippi v. Johnson, the law has
shifted from the idea that the President of the United States could
not be sued to the idea that the President is accountable in the
courts for his official conduct. Since Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
President has enjoyed absolute immunity from suits for damages,
but the history of post-Watergate litigation against the President
is a history of increasing acceptance among courts and plaintiffs
of the use of suits to prevent or compel a broad spectrum of
m' See id. at 1567-68. The court rejected the position of the Department of Defense
that any claim concerning the United States military falls within the political question
doctrine. Id. at 1568.
See id. at 1570.
31 See id. at 1571.
Id. at 1572.
See id. at 1575.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
presidential conduct. What is conspicuously missing from this his-
tory is the voice of the Supreme Court. In United States v. Nixon
a unanimous Court sent mixed signals: that the President could
not withhold relevant evidence from a criminal prosecution, but
that the Constitution afforded the President a loosely defined
executive privilege from some of the ordinary demands of the
judicial process. In Fitzgerald, a divided court amplified those
signals to a serious dissonance over the way in which the President,
as defendant, should be treated within the judicial system, and the
Justices favoring a special exemption prevailed. Since that time,
the Court has acted chiefly to deny certiorari to cases involving
the President, or, as in Goldwater v. Carter, to offer a result
without a rationale. 388
In the absence of any clear direction from the Supreme Court,
the lower federal courts have developed their own strategies for
handling suits against the President. The courts no longer question
the propriety of naming the President as a defendant. Instead, they
deflect their concern onto the other elements of the suits before
them. They question whether the plaintiff has standing, whether
the case raises a political question, whether an issue is moot or
ripe, or whether prudence counsels the exercise of judicial re-
straint. 389 Doctrine in all of these areas of the law is imprecise, and
it is hardly surprising that courts reach different conclusions for
similar cases. There is no Supreme Court precedent for the courts
to cite; United States v. Nixon is almost never mentioned, and
Nixon v. Fitzgerald is useful only when a misguided plaintiff asks
for damages from the President.
The courts have, however, reached a loose consensus regarding
certain situations. When the President is joined with other executive
branch officials as a defendant in a suit challenging the application
of a federal statute, the courts generally ignore his presence and
resolve the case as an ordinary matter of statutory interpretation.
390
-1
The Court vacated the decision on the merits below and directed dismissal of the
case without opinion. For an account of the separate opinions filed by four members of
the Court, see supra note 281.
- For an article suggesting that such bases for resolving cases should be replaced by
a special court authorized to issue advisory opinions, see Wallach, supra note 3.
390 See Bruff, supra note 3, at 59-60 (suggesting that courts reviewing presidential
decisions apply an "explanation requirement"). Although Bruff regards as a disadvantage
the fact that such a requirement would compel courts to set aside some decisions by the
President, he notes that "it would have the compensating advantage of ensuring his political
accountability for the rationale finally adopted." Id. at 60.
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If injunctive relief is awarded in such cases, the courts no longer
pause to distinguish between ministerial and discretionary presiden-
tial conduct; instead, they tend to leave unspoken the fact that the
injunction may run to the President as well as his subordinates.
The situation is somewhat more problematical when the challenged
statutory conduct flows more directly from the President, but even
here, when other defendants are present, the courts seem comfort-
able reviewing the cases on the merits. The most troubling cases
are those raising constitutional challenges to presidential actions,
and it is here that the lower courts have been unable to find
common ground. As the Persian Gulf War cases demonstrated,
the political question doctrine accommodates disparate viewpoints,
and one district court may feel constrained from adjudicating an
issue that another feels compelled to reach. Yet the constitutional
cases present the most significant and delicate questions of the
division of authority among the branches of government, and
inconsistency in the lower courts makes the resolution of such
questions a disturbingly arbitrary process.
Underlying some of the differences among the lower courts is
the concern that suits against the President may politicize the legal
process. The District of Columbia Circuit, which hears the cases
filed by members of Congress, has responded by creating its own
doctrine of discretionary restraint. In citizen suits against the recent
war, courts again revealed conflicting attitudes toward private
plaintiffs using litigation as a means of challenging the policies of
the political branches. Although these courts agreed that standing
doctrine clearly barred taxpayer suits against the war, such easy
solutions are not always available. When the consequences of a
policy are widespread, it may be difficult to deny standing to those
clearly suffering injury in fact. Even when standing doctrine pro-
vides no barrier to suit, other adaptable doctrines exist to permit
dismissal by skeptical courts. It may be difficult to distinguish
between a court's institutional distaste for the nature of a suit and
its application of amorphous doctrines of justiciability to avoid
review on the merits.
If the lower courts have learned to adapt existing doctrines to
the special circumstances of presidential litigation, why does it
matter that the Supreme Court has not spoken on the subject for
a decade? Is the naming of the President as defendant a purely
formal gesture of little substantive concern? There are two related
answers, one based on the nature of the presidency itself and the
other on the role of the Court. As John Marshall made clear in
1991-92]
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
Marbury v. Madison and in United States v. Burr, the essence of
the American system of government is the accountability of the
executive branch for its official acts. A President who enjoys
special dispensations from the obligations of all citizens and pro-
tection from the consequences of his conduct is a creature of
privilege rather than of law. The approach proposed by Marshall
balances the accountability of the President with the practical
demands of his office; it gives courts the discretion to evaluate a
President's claims of hardship in the context of particular demands
and to adjust his ordinary obligations to the legal system in light
of those hardships. Marshall insisted, however, on treating the
President as one citizen among many and rejected any preferences
that granted to the presidency the prerogatives of the British crown.
United States v. Nixon cited Burr repeatedly without fully
capturing its meaning. The Court ordered the President to comply
with the district court's subpoena, but it linked that order with an
unprecedented and undocumented recognition of executive privi-
lege. The immediate result of the opinion was a triumph for the
rule of law: a recalcitrant President bowed to the Court's mandate.
The subsequent effect of the opinion is less clear. In the rush of
suits against the President that followed, the lower courts found
little sustenance in United States v. Nixon as they approached their
new task of determining which suits were proper and which were
not. Nixon v. Fitzgerald further complicated the issue by granting
the President absolute immunity from tort liability in the face of
a powerful dissent arguing against such special protection. Neither
case adopted Marshall's position that the President is not above
the law although circumstances may dictate special accommodation
to presidential demands. Read together, the two cases offer an
inconsistent and incomplete framework for evaluating litigation
against the President.
If accountability is the hallmark of the executive branch, then
principled adjudication is the hallmark of the judicial branch, and
it is here that the Supreme Court's reticence leaves an unfortunate
lacuna. The lower courts have performed creditably, finding prac-
tical responses to the suits brought before them, adapting old
doctrines to new uses, or creating new doctrine to meet new situa-
tions. They have performed, however, without the guidance of the
Supreme Court and therefore most often without an articulated
basis for their resolutions. The story of post-Watergate presidential
accountability has been one of improvisation by the lower courts
rather than leadership by the Supreme Court. What is missing from
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the record is any clear perspective on an issue of central importance
to the nature of American government and the role of the courts
in its preservation; the Court has failed to meet its institutional
obligation to define for the lower courts and for the country the
contours of the relationship of presidential power to the legal
process. To find Supreme Court language illuminating the Presi-
dent's accountability, it is necessary to look beyond the Nixon
cases to one of the Court's most eloquent members, Justice Jack-
son, writing in concurrence two decades before Watergate: "With
all its defects, delays, and inconveniences, men have discovered no
technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law. '
391
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952).
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